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INTRODUCTION 
As much as Americans love sugar, overconsumption can turn 
something so sweet into something deadly.  Excessive sugar 
consumption is linked to obesity and an increased risk of heart 
disease.1  The rise in obesity rates is clearly correlated with the 
increase of sugar in the American diet—between 1980 and 1990, 
United States obesity rates rose parallel to increases in the production 
of sugar in the food supply, with similar trends continuing into the 
twenty-first century.2  Obesity is a serious condition that can cause 
severe health problems3 and even death.4  Additionally, the estimated 
direct and indirect costs of obesity have risen to a staggering $190 
billion each year.5  Some experts adamantly assert that sugar is the 
cause of obesity and advocate that a reduction in sugar intake could 
have significant health benefits within the United States.6 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Allison Aubrey, PepsiCo Pledges to Cut Sugar As Big Soda Comes Under 
Scrutiny, NPR (Oct. 17, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2016/10/17/
498274851/pepsico-pledges-to-cut-sugar-as-big-soda-comes-under-scrutiny 
[https://perma.cc/E3W2-BMBM]. See generally Kimber L. Stanhope, Sugar 
Consumption, Metabolic Disease and Obesity:  The State of the Controversy, 
CRITICAL REVS. IN CLINICAL LAB. SCI. 52 (Sept. 17, 2015); Gary Taubes, Is Sugar 
Toxic?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Apr. 13, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/
04/17/magazine/mag-17Sugar-t.html [https://perma.cc/K9LM-5RB4]. 
 2. MARION NESTLE, SODA POLITICS:  TAKING ON BIG SODA AND WINNING 42-43 
(2015). 
 3. Obesity increases an individual’s risk of—and may even cause—coronary 
heart disease, high blood pressure, stroke, type 2 diabetes, abnormal blood fats, 
metabolic syndrome, cancer (specifically colon, breast, endometrial, and gallbladder 
cancers), osteoarthritis, sleep apnea, obesity hypoventilation syndrome, reproductive 
problems, and gallstones.  Health Risks of Being Overweight, NAT’L INST. OF 
DIABETES & DIGESTIVE & KIDNEY DISEASES, https://www.niddk.nih.gov/health-
information/weight-management/health-risks-overweight [https://perma.cc/APF7-
2BXF]. 
 4. In 2000, the Journal of the American Medical Association found that obesity 
caused 400,000 deaths. Samuel J. Romero, Obesity Liability:  A Super-Sized Problem 
or a Small Fry in the Inevitable Development of Product Liability?, 7 CHAP. L. REV. 
239, 241 (2004) (citing Alit H. Mokdad et al., Actual Causes of Death in the United 
States, 2000, 291 JAMA 1238, 1238-40 (2004)). 
 5. In 2001, the Surgeon General estimated the direct and indirect costs of obesity 
were approximately $117 billion a year. Romero, supra note 4, at 241 (citing OFF. OF 
THE SURGEON GEN., THE SURGEON GENERAL’S CALL TO ACTION TO PREVENT AND 
DECREASE OVERWEIGHT AND OBESITY 10 (2001), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
books/NBK44206/ [https://perma.cc/6WD5-FNSJ]).  Economists in 2012 estimated 
the cost at $190 billion per year. MARION NESTLE, FOOD POLITICS:  HOW THE FOOD 
INDUSTRY INFLUENCES NUTRITION AND HEALTH 393 (2002) (citing J. Cawley & C. 
Meyerhoefer, The Medical Care Costs of Obesity:  An Instrumental Variables 
Approach, 31 J. HEALTH ECON. 219-30 (2012)). 
 6. See generally Taubes, supra note 1. 
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Dr. William Dietz, a preventative health expert at George 
Washington University, explains that “[w]e know that sugar intake is 
an important contributor to obesity, and . . . soft drinks and soda and 
juices are a major source of sugar calories.”7  As a major source of 
sugar calories, sodas alone account for one third of daily American 
sugar consumption8 and, therefore, reducing soda consumption is a 
meaningful way to reduce sugar intake.  For example, a single twelve 
ounce can of Coca-Cola contains thirty-nine grams of sugar (or ten 
sugar cubes), approximately 156 and 108 percent of the daily 
recommended sugar intake that the American Heart Association 
(“AHA”) recommends for women and men, respectively.9  Sodas 
pose various health risks, as the ingredients in soda, most notably 
sugar, are linked to a number of health conditions, including “obesity, 
type 2 diabetes, coronary artery disease, stroke dental disease, bone 
disease, gout, asthma, cancers, rheumatoid arthritis, behavioral 
problems, [and possibly] addiction.”10  While many believe diet is an 
individual choice, large food corporations, including big soda 
companies, have undue influence over how society views nutrition, 
diet, and their specific products.11  Individuals and governments 
should hold these large corporations, and specifically soda companies, 
accountable for creating products that contain extreme levels of 
sugar.  Only then will the companies be forced to acknowledge the 
inherently dangerous qualities of their products and modify them to 
create a safer dietary environment for children and adults alike. 
Data shows that certain populations are more likely to drink 
regular soda (with large amounts of sugar) and are therefore more 
                                                                                                                 
 7. Aubrey, supra note 1; see also Editorial Board, Mexico’s Soda Tax Success, 
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 8, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-01-08/
mexico-s-soda-tax-success [https://perma.cc/8ZAM-NXGX] (“Sugary drinks are 
among the primary drivers of obesity.”). 
 8. NESTLE, supra note 2, at 42. 
 9. The American Heart Association recommends men consume no more than 
nine teaspoons (or thirty-six grams) of added sugar a day and women consume no 
more than six teaspoons (or twenty-five grams) of added sugar a day. Sugar 101, AM. 
HEART ASS’N, http://www.heart.org/HEARTORG/HealthyLiving/HealthyEating/
Nutrition/Sugar-101_UCM_306024_Article.jsp#.WBwo6OErJ-U 
[https://perma.cc/FC7G-JF65] (last updated Oct. 11, 2016). 
 10. NESTLE, supra note 2, at 64. 
 11. See generally NESTLE, supra note 5.  D. Mark Hegsted, one of the scientists 
paid by the Sugar Association to play down the link between sugar and adverse 
health effects, became the head of nutrition at the United States Department of 
Agriculture and helped draft the federal government’s dietary guidelines in 1977. 
Anahad O’Connor, How the Sugar Industry Shifted Blame to Fat, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
12, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/13/well/eat/how-the-sugar-industry-
shifted-blame-to-fat.html [https://perma.cc/TV4P-KTE9]. 
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vulnerable to the significant health risks noted above.12  The 
Beverage Marketing Corporation13 routinely collects information 
about soda consumers and analyzes consumption within certain 
demographic groups.14  This data shows that blue-collar workers and 
those earning less than $10,000 engage in “higher-than-average soda” 
intake than the overall population.15  Hispanic and African 
Americans also consume more soda and exhibit an increased 
occurrence of obesity and type 2 diabetes than white Americans.16  
Approximately seventy percent of Hispanic and African Americans 
reported routinely drinking regular (sugar-sweetened) sodas, and 
these populations are more likely to consume regular soda when 
compared to the overall population.17  These figures, taken together, 
paint a clear picture—minority populations living in low-income areas 
are more likely to engage in overconsumption of soda, and therefore 
have increased exposure to the resulting health dangers.18 
The soda industry’s intentional marketing practices, not individual 
choice, create this increased risk.  First, the soda industry specifically 
targets Hispanic and African American communities.19  Both Pepsi 
and Coca-Cola market to these populations and also use seemingly 
charitable contributions to form relationships with these 
communities.20  Many leaders within the Hispanic and African 
                                                                                                                 
 12. NESTLE, supra note 2, at 34-35. 
 13. The Beverage Marketing Corporation provides consulting, research, and 
advisory services to the food and beverage industries. See Who We Are, BEVERAGE 
MKTG. CORP., https://www.beveragemarketing.com/who-we-are.asp [https://perma.cc/
VV6N-AMCA]. 
 14. NESTLE, supra note 2, at 34-35. 
 15. Individuals with a yearly income of less than $10,000 are sixteen percent more 
likely to consume regular soda than the overall population. Id. at 35. 
 16. Id. at 186. 
 17. Hispanics and African Americans are twenty-one and thirteen percent more 
likely, respectively, to consume regular soda. Id. at 35, 186. 
 18. These dangers will be discussed in detail in infra Part II. 
 19. NESTLE, supra note 2, at 185.  The Hispanic Institute’s president, Gus West 
stated, “[o]f course, we’re responsible for what we eat and drink . . . but we’re also 
subject to the effects of massive advertising and misleading promotional campaigns—
especially on our children and the poor.” Id. 
 20. Soda companies target Hispanic children by advertising on Spanish-language 
television and by using Spanish-speaking celebrities.  These companies use similar 
tactics when advertising to African American children featuring African American 
celebrities.  In addition to targeted television advertisements, soda companies also 
produce print publications aimed at promoting cultural values. Id. at 194-95.  
Additionally, soda companies promote brand loyalty through seemingly 
philanthropic foundations that now appear to be further marketing techniques that 
are manipulative rather than beneficial for these minority communities. Id. at 194-96.  
When journalists and leaders within these communities receive funding or 
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communities have noticed, and have begun distancing themselves and 
denouncing soda companies.21  These leaders recognize that health 
concerns relating to obesity are blighting their communities and place 
significant blame on the soda companies.22  Second, these minority 
communities are not choosing increased exposure to soda and the 
health risks contained therein.  Those living in low-income, urban 
populations often have limited or no access to healthy food options.23  
Even when minority populations living in urban areas have physical 
access to fresh and healthy foods, low-income individuals may not be 
able to afford the often hefty and unattainable price tag.24  
Ultimately, through limited access to healthy alternatives and the 
specific targeting of minority groups, these often urban populations 
are more susceptible to overconsumption and are more vulnerable to 
the health risks indicated by consuming large amounts of sugary 
sodas.25  Therefore, minority and urban communities are 
disproportionately impacted by the dangerous health risks inherent in 
overconsumption of sugary sodas.26 
This Note addresses the current health risks that can arise from 
consuming large or excessive volumes of sugary sodas and offers legal 
proposals to prevent further harm.  Section I.A provides background 
information about the current public health crisis related to the rise in 
obesity and diabetes among Americans.  Section I.B offers insight 
into the use of sugar by large food corporations.  Section I.C describes 
Big Soda’s intentional use of sugar within its products.  Part II 
                                                                                                                 
philanthropic gifts, these individuals can hardly be expected to write stories or 
publicly criticize soda companies for creating products that contribute to the poor 
health in their communities. Id. at 196. 
 21. The Hispanic Institute of Washington, D.C. in 2013 urged its Hispanic 
constituents to cease collaboration with soda companies. Id. at 185. 
 22. West urged community organizations to “walk away from funding by the 
processed food and big sugary drink companies,” demonstrating a break with soda 
companies similar to many Hispanic organizations’ break in the 1990s with tobacco 
companies. Id. 
 23. SARAH TREUHAFT & ALLISON KARPYN, POL’YLINK & FOOD TR., THE 
GROCERY GAP:  WHO HAS ACCESS TO HEALTHY FOOD AND WHY IT MATTERS 7 
(2010), http://thefoodtrust.org/uploads/media_items/grocerygap.original.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/N34S-J5JR]; see also INST. OF MED., ACCELERATING PROGRESS IN 
OBESITY PREVENTION 3 (2012). 
 24. Many Americans living in low-income urban areas are concerned with 
whether they will eat, rather than the nutritional value of what they will eat. SASHA 
ABRAMSKY, BREADLINE USA:  THE HIDDEN SCANDAL OF AMERICAN HUNGER AND 
HOW TO FIX IT 14 (2011).  Unfortunately, “unhealthy diets cost less, while the 
recommended healthier diets cost more.” Adam Drewnowski, Obesity, Diets, and 
Social Inequalities, 67 NUTRITION REV. S36, S37 (2009). 
 25. NESTLE, supra note 2, at 35-36, 185-86. 
 26. Id. 
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examines potential approaches to addressing the current health 
concerns, including the effectiveness of federal and state 
governments, past food litigation, and finally reviews the success of 
previous tobacco litigation.  Part III identifies the most successful 
avenues and legal theories that will best protect consumers in future 
years. 
I.  HOW COULD SOMETHING SO SWEET BE SO DANGEROUS? 
The current health crisis did not develop overnight.  Since 1958, the 
percentage of Americans diagnosed with diabetes rose by 700 
percent.27  This rise in diabetes is not disappearing anytime soon, as 
one in three Americans born after 2000 will be diagnosed with early-
onset diabetes.28  Additionally, since 1980 the percentage of the 
United States’ population that is obese has increased.29  Both obesity 
and diabetes pose serious health risks, and are largely preventable by 
eating a healthy diet.30  Obesity and diabetes are serious health 
conditions in themselves, but they also increase the likelihood of 
metabolic syndrome, coronary heart disease, and even cancer, among 
other diseases.31  In addition to the serious health concerns posed by 
the rise in obesity, this disease poses significant economic costs.  In 
2001, the estimated annual direct and indirect cost of obesity was $117 
and rose to $190 billion a year in 2012.32 
                                                                                                                 
 27. In 1958, 1.58 million people, less than one percent of the United States 
population, were diagnosed with diabetes.  Since then, these statistics have risen 
dramatically.  As of 2015, over 23.35 million people, comprising 7.4 percent of the 
United States’ population, have been diagnosed with diabetes. CDC, LONG-TERM 
TRENDS IN DIABETES (Apr. 2016), http://www.cdc.gov/diabetes/statistics/slides/
long_term_trends.pdf [https://perma.cc/CT46-LF8S]. 
 28. FOOD, INC. (Robert Kenner 2009). 
 29. In 2014, 28.9 percent of adults were obese (up from 28.4 percent in 2011) and 
approximately twenty-two million adults have been diagnosed with diabetes (in 1980, 
5.5 million adults were diagnosed with diabetes).  In 2013, 13.7 percent of adolescents 
were obese (up from 11.8 percent in 2009). CDC, Nutrition, Physical Activity and 
Obesity:  Data, Trends and Maps, https://nccd.cdc.gov/NPAO_DTM/Location
Summary.aspx?statecode=94 [https://perma.cc/4NUW-MQNA]. 
 30. Obesity and Overweight, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/
mediacentre/factsheets/fs311/en/ [https://perma.cc/TW2V-JQLH] (last updated June 
2016); Diabetes is Preventable, NAT’L INST. OF DIABETES & DIGESTIVE & KIDNEY 
DISEASES, https://www.niddk.nih.gov/health-information/health-communication-prog
rams/ndep/am-i-at-risk/diabetes-preventable/Pages/diabetesispreventable.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/XN9G-E9A6]. 
 31. NESTLE, supra note 2, at 64-73. 
 32. Romero, supra note 4, at 241 (citing OFF. OF THE SURGEON GEN., THE 
SURGEON GENERAL’S CALL TO ACTION TO PREVENT AND DECREASE OVERWEIGHT 
AND OBESITY 10 (2001)); see also NESTLE, supra note 5, at 393. 
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As obesity rates and the number of Americans diagnosed with type 
2 diabetes have increased in recent decades, so too has the 
consumption of sugar within the United States.33  This correlation has 
led many researchers and experts to conclude that overconsumption 
of sugar is linked to obesity and diabetes, two health and diet related 
diseases.34  In addition to sugars in everyday foods, sweetened sodas 
interact differently with the body.35  Some scholars believe that 
consuming sugar through soda leads to sugar overconsumption, and 
therefore sodas are a large cause of the obesity epidemic.36 
A. The Problem with Sugar 
Sugar, in moderation, is a perfectly acceptable part of any 
nutritious diet.37  The issue is what constitutes an excessive amount or 
an overconsumption of sugar that can reach a dangerous level.  The 
risk of heart disease death begins to increase when fifteen percent of 
daily calories come from added sugars and increases significantly 
above that fifteen-percentage threshold.38  With that in mind, “[i]n 
the United States, children are said to consume an average of 16 
percent of their daily calories from sugars added to foods and drinks, 
and adults 13 percent.”39 
Considered in pounds of sugar per person per year, by the early 
twenty-first century, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) 
calculated that on average, Americans consumed over ninety pounds 
per person per year.40  Further demonstrating the mass availability of 
sugar, in 2011, the U.S. supply produced domestically (less exports, 
                                                                                                                 
 33. See Aubrey, supra note 1.  “This correlation between sugar consumption and 
diabetes is what defense attorneys call circumstantial evidence.  It’s more compelling 
than it otherwise might be, though, because the last time sugar consumption jumped 
markedly in this country, it was also associated with a diabetes epidemic.” Taubes, 
supra note 1, at 8. 
 34. See generally NESTLE, supra note 2, at 60-63; Stanhope, supra note 1; Taubes, 
supra note 1. 
 35. See NESTLE, supra note 2, at 47; Taubes, supra note 1. 
 36. See generally NESTLE, supra note 2, at 45-48, 64-69; NESTLE, supra note 5, at 
405-06. 
 37. NESTLE, supra note 2, at 38.  “Dr. Robert Lustig, a pediatric endocrinologist 
concerned about the effects of sugars on children’s health, calls sugar a poison, 
although one directly related to dose.  A dose of up to 50 grams a day, he says, poses 
little risk.” Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Taubes, supra note 1, at 7-8 (noting that in 1986, the USDA estimated that 
Americans were consuming seventy-five pounds of sugar per capita yearly, 
representing an increase of sugar consumption). 
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plus imports) totaled nearly 132 pounds per capita.41  Both domestic 
and global health organizations recommend a much smaller daily 
sugar intake.42  The AHA recommends men consume no more than 
nine teaspoons (or thirty-six grams) of added sugar a day and women 
consume no more than six teaspoons (or twenty-five grams) of added 
sugar a day.43  In pounds, the AHA recommends men and women 
consume approximately twenty-nine and twenty pounds of sugar 
annually, roughly one third of the current average consumption.44  
Globally, the World Health Organization (“WHO”) strongly 
recommends that both children and adults reduce their daily sugar45 
consumption to less than ten percent of total calories.46  While many 
authorities agree on the ten percent (or approximately fifty gram) 
daily sugar recommendation, Dr. Lustig, a pediatric endocrinologist, 
asserts that consuming twice the recommended “dose” of sugar can 
prove toxic.47  Putting things in perspective, a single twelve ounce can 
of regular Coca Cola contains thirty-nine grams of sugar and a twelve 
ounce can of Pepsi contains forty-one grams of sugar, both of which 
exceed the AHA daily recommendation for sugar consumption for 
both men and women.48  Because sodas only account for 
                                                                                                                 
 41. NESTLE, supra note 2, at 41-42 (noting that “67 pounds of cane and beet 
sugars (sucrose), 47 pounds of high-fructose corn syrup (HFCS), and the rest from 
honey, maple syrup, and other such sources.”). 
 42. “[M]ost health authorities recommending consuming no more than 10 percent 
of calories from added sugars per day.” NESTLE, supra note 2, at 38. 
 43. AM. HEART ASS’N, supra note 9. 
 44. Id.  “By the early 2000s, according to the U.S.D.A., we had increased our 
[sugar] consumption to more than 90 pounds per person per year.”  Taubes, supra 
note 1, at 7-8. 
 45. “Free sugars include monosaccharides and disaccharides added to foods and 
beverages by the manufacturer, cook or consumer, and sugars naturally present in 
honey, syrups, fruit juices and fruit juice concentrates.” WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
GUIDELINE:  SUGARS INTAKE FOR ADULTS AND CHILDREN 16 (2015), http://apps.who.
int/iris/bitstream/10665/149782/1/9789241549028_eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/KXF9-
SWQ7]. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Nestle notes “Dr. Lustig’s 100-gram toxic dose is close to the upper level of 
nutritional safety—25 percent of total calories—proposed in 2002 by the Institute of 
Medicine”; however, the Institute of Medicine intended that percentage as the upper 
limit for safety purposes and was not intended to represent a recommendation. 
NESTLE, supra note 2, at 38. 
 48. Product Facts, COCA-COLA, http://www.coca-colaproductfacts.com/en/coca-
cola-products/coca-cola/ [https://perma.cc/SYU2-YMFP]; The Facts About Your 
Favorite Beverages:  Pepsi, PEPSICO, http://www.pepsicobeveragefacts.com/Home/
product?formula=35005*26*01-01&form=RTD&size=12 [https://perma.cc/Y68A-
PSTC] (last updated Mar. 23, 2017).  One twelve ounce can of Coca-Cola represents 
approximately 156 and 108 percent of the American Heart Association’s daily added 
sugar recommendation for women and men, respectively.  One twelve ounce can of 
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approximately one third of Americans’ daily added sugar 
consumption, even limiting soda consumption to a single serving a 
day would still likely result in consuming more than the daily 
recommendation.49  Obesity and sugar consumption are intrinsically 
connected and overconsumption of sugar can often result in obesity 
as well as associated health risks.50 
B. What Makes Soda So Bad? 
One common question is “what makes soda so bad?”  First and 
foremost, despite the common misconception, all calories are not 
created equal.  A calorie is not simply a calorie.51  Due to its liquid 
form, soda rapidly delivers large amounts of sugar to the blood 
stream.52  Soda calories are empty calories devoid of any nutritional 
benefit.53  Studies have further found that consumption of sugar 
through liquid form bypasses the psychological regulatory system 
controlling appetite and food intake in rats and mice.54  This means 
the brain does not communicate with the rest of the body that it is 
full.55  Furthermore, soda (and other processed foods) is specifically 
formulated so that human taste buds are not overwhelmed with any 
single flavor in the product.56  Soda and processed food 
                                                                                                                 
Pepsi represents approximately 164 and 114 percent of the American Heart 
Association’s daily added sugar recommendation for women and men, respectively. 
AM. HEART ASS’N, supra note 9. 
 49. NESTLE, supra note 2, at 42. 
 50. From 1980 to the late 1990s, “obesity rose in parallel to the increasing 
production of sugars in the food supply.” Id. at 43; Taubes, supra note 1, at 8.  As 
Judge Sweet noted in Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp., “studies have shown that both 
modest and large weight gains are associated with significantly increased risk of 
diseases.” 237 F. Supp. 2d 512, 520 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 51. As Dr. Robert Lustig explains, when you consume 160 calories in almonds, 
the food will not be absorbed into the body immediately because the fiber in the 
almonds will not be absorbed immediately.  Therefore, the body’s blood sugar will 
rise more slowly.  Dr. Lustig goes on to contrast the almond with 160 calories of a soft 
drink.  “Because there is no fiber [in the soda, the calories] get absorbed straight 
through the portal system to the liver.  The liver gets this big sugar rush.  When your 
liver gets that onslaught, it has no choice but to turn it into fat immediately.” FED UP 
(Stephanie Soechtig 2014). 
 52. NESTLE, supra note 2, at 45; Taubes, supra note 1, at 6. 
 53. NESTLE, supra note 2, at 45-46 (“Some studies of human eating behavior 
support this idea:  the more sugary drinks people consume, the more calories they 
consume from any source.”). 
 54. “Most research suggests that it is only the sugars consumed in drinks that 
bypass physiological regulatory controls.” Id. at 46. 
 55. MICHAEL MOSS, SALT, SUGAR, FAT:  HOW THE FOOD GIANTS HOOKED US 98-
99 (2013).  High levels of insulin caused by consumption of soda also block your brain 
from receiving the signal that you are full. See FED UP, supra note 51. 
 56. MOSS, supra note 55, at 105. 
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manufacturers encourage overconsumption with products that bypass 
the psychological regulatory system controlling appetite, and they 
utilize a formula that will not overwhelm the consumer.57  In humans, 
studies have shown that “the more sugary drinks people consume, the 
more calories they consume from any source.”58  Individuals who 
drink soda are at risk of consuming too many calories on a daily basis 
without gaining any nutritional benefit from the empty soda calories. 
Soda is also particularly problematic, because fructose (which 
usually makes up at least half of the sweeteners in sodas), unlike 
glucose or sucrose, is metabolized almost completely in the liver.59  
Although a hundred calories of glucose is the same number of 
calories as a hundred calories of sugar (half glucose, half fructose), 
the metabolic consequences are different.60  Because fructose is 
metabolized solely by the liver, any sudden increase in fructose could 
overwhelm liver function.61  In response to the fructose, the body, and 
specifically the pancreas, creates insulin to maintain blood sugar 
levels.62  While the pancreas is generally capable of managing 
reasonable rises in blood sugar, when blood sugar is consistently and 
rapidly rising, it cannot keep up with the demand.63  At this point the 
body is suffering “pancreatic exhaustion,” as the pancreas can no 
longer create the necessary insulin to control the body’s blood sugar 
levels, and the individual now has diabetes.64  Additionally, “[w]hen 
fructose is consumed in excessive amounts, it is converted to fat in the 
liver and causes a rise in levels of blood triglycerides.”65  Studies 
suggest there is an association between added fructose, such as the 
                                                                                                                 
 57. Id. at 104-06. 
 58. NESTLE, supra note 2, at 45-46. 
 59. Id. at 47; Taubes, supra note 1, at 5; see also FED UP, supra note 51 (“[W]hen 
your liver is pushed to the max the pancreas comes to the rescue by creating excess 
amounts of a hormone called insulin . . . [and] insulin [then] turns sugar into fat for 
storage.  That’s insulin’s job.”). 
 60. Taubes, supra note 1, at 5. 
 61. Id. at 6.   
In animals, or at least in laboratory rats and mice, it’s clear that if the 
fructose hits the liver in sufficient quantity and with sufficient speed, the 
liver will convert much of it to fat.  This apparently induces a condition 
known as insulin resistance, which is now considered the fundamental 
problem in obesity, and the underlying defect in heart disease and in the 
type of diabetes, type 2, that is common to obese and overweight 
individuals.  It might also be the underlying defect in many cancers. 
Id. 
 62. Id. at 11. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 11-12. 
 65. Id. 
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fructose found in sodas, and metabolic problems, including 
“metabolic syndrome,” a condition known to raise the risk of heart 
disease and type 2 diabetes.66  These health conditions are discussed 
in greater detail in Section I.C. 
Another issue unique to soda is the possibility that, due to the 
combination of certain ingredients, it may be addictive.67  The 
scientific evidence supporting this is still being developed, and this 
topic is discussed at greater length in Part III.  Ultimately, because 
sodas contribute such a significant percentage of daily sugar in the 
American diet, “they raise the same concerns as sugar alone.”68  
Therefore, many of the concerns related to general overconsumption 
of sugar can be applied to the overconsumption of soda. 
C. Soda and the Obesity Crisis 
Between 1980 and 2000, production of soda rose from twenty-seven 
gallons per person a year to over forty gallons per person a year.69  
Along with this notable rise in soda production, obesity rates in the 
United States doubled from fifteen percent to approximately thirty 
percent of the population.70  Additionally, the prevalence of obesity 
among specific population groups closely aligns with their patterns of 
soda consumption.71  In 2012, over one hundred health groups and 
individuals urged the Surgeon General in a press release to produce a 
report concerning soda consumption, similar to the Surgeon 
General’s reports on smoking in previous decades: 
Soda and other sugary drinks are the only food or beverage that has 
been directly linked to obesity, a major contributor to coronary 
heart disease, stroke, type 2 diabetes, and some cancers, and a cause 
                                                                                                                 
 66. Id. (citing Trevor J. Carden & Timothy P. Carr, Food Availability of Glucose 
and Fat, But Not Fructose, Increased in the U.S. between 1970 and 2009:  Analysis of 
the USDA Food Availability Data System, 12 NUTRITION J. 130 (2013)).  As Gary 
Taubes explains,  
[c]onsuming sugar (fructose and glucose) means more work for the liver 
than if you consumed the same number of calories of starch (glucose).  And 
if you take that sugar in liquid form—soda or fruit juices—the fructose and 
glucose will hit the liver more quickly than if you consume them, say, in an 
apple (or several apples, to get what researchers would call the equivalent 
dose of sugar).  The speed with which the liver has to do its work will also 
affect how it metabolizes the fructose and glucose. 
Taubes, supra note 1. 
 67. NESTLE, supra note 2, at 49. 
 68. Id. at 45. 
 69. Id. at 67. 
 70. Id. 
 71. “Both soda consumption and obesity are highest among African and Hispanic 
Americans, followed by whites and Asians.” Id. 
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of psychosocial problems . . . . Yet, each year, the average American 
drinks about 40 gallons of sugary drinks, all with little, if any, 
nutritional benefit.72 
It is helpful to look at other health problems to further understand 
the causal connection between soda consumption and obesity.  
Research pertaining to childhood obesity presents glaring evidence 
that children who habitually drink soda consume more calories, have 
worse eating habits, and ultimately weigh more than children who do 
not.73  Consuming even a single additional soda in a child’s daily diet 
increases the chance of becoming overweight.74  Further emphasizing 
the concerns of childhood obesity and soda consumption, the 2010 
Dietary Guidelines Advisory Committee concluded that children 
should be discouraged from consuming sugar-sweetened beverages.75  
Research has shown that sodas are linked to poor diets.  Although 
sodas contain many ingredients: 
Studies often link one or another ingredient in soda, mostly sugars, 
to a broad array of chronic health conditions, most notably obesity, 
type 2 diabetes and coronary heart disease, but also stroke, dental 
disease, bone disease, gout, asthma, cancers, rheumatoid arthritis, 
behavioral problems, and even psychological disorders and 
premature aging, not to mention addiction.76 
Most independent research—funded by grants from government 
agencies or private foundations—similarly concluded that habitual 
soda consumption is not good for an individual’s health.77 
Sodas contain large amounts of sugar78 that are metabolized in a 
particularly harmful way.  Because soda delivers the sugar (fructose) 
in liquid form, it floods the body’s metabolic system, thereby 
exacerbating the already harmful effect of sugar consumption.79  
Additionally, soda’s formula encourages and likely causes 
overconsumption of sugar on a daily basis.80  Based on the large 
                                                                                                                 
 72. NESTLE, supra note 5, at 405-06 (citation omitted). 
 73. NESTLE, supra note 2, at 67. 
 74. Id. at 68. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 64-65.  It is important to note that the soda industry sponsors its own 
research studies, but “practically all studies reporting adverse effects of sodas on 
health were funded by grants from government agencies or private foundations.” Id. 
at 65. 
 77. Id. at 66. 
 78. COCA-COLA, supra note 48; PEPSICO, supra note 48. 
 79. For a full description of soda’s metabolic effect, see discussion supra Section 
I.B. 
 80. MOSS, supra note 55, at 98-99, 104-06. See also discussion supra Section I.B. 
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amounts of sugar in soda and the correlation between soda 
consumption and obesity, many authorities have asserted that soda is 
a major cause of the current obesity crisis.81  Beyond scholastic and 
scientific analyses, a former president of the North and South 
America division in Coca-Cola admits: 
The obesity trend is an epidemic, [a]nd there is no question its roots 
are directly tied to the expansion of fast food, junk food, and soft 
drink consumption.  Whether you can identify any one of those 
things is probably a fair question.  Soft drink guys prospect on that 
all the time.  But you can look at the obesity rates, and you can look 
at per capita consumption of sugary soft drinks and overlap those on 
a map, and I promise you:  They correlate about .99999 percent.82 
Soda consumption is significant, real, dangerous, and expensive to 
the American consumer.  Given the rise in diseases that are 
connected to sugar consumption, and more specifically soda 
consumption, research should begin exploring the role of sugary 
sodas in the obesity and diabetes epidemics. 
D. Sugar versus Fat:  How the Food Companies Sculpted the Public 
Health Narrative 
Through funding research and lobbying, the food industry 
consistently seeks to influence domestic nutrition guidelines to 
benefit companies in the industry.83  As a general matter, studies 
suggest that industry-funded research may favorably bias the findings 
towards the industry providing funding.84  In fact, “[a] recent analysis 
of beverage studies . . . found that those funded by Coca-Cola, Pepsi, 
the American Beverage Association and the sugar industry were five 
times more likely to find no link between sugar drinks and weight 
gain than studies whose authors reported no financial conflicts.”85  
Recently uncovered documents from the sugar industry “suggest that 
five decades of research into the role of nutrition and heart disease, 
including many of today’s dietary recommendations, have been 
largely shaped by the sugar industry.”86  Specifically, the Sugar 
                                                                                                                 
 81. NESTLE, supra note 5, at 405-06. 
 82. MOSS, supra note 55, at 100. 
 83. See Romero, supra note 4, at 242 (citing NESTLE, supra note 5, at 67-92); see 
generally MOSS, supra note 55. 
 84. See Anahad O’Connor, Coca-Cola Funds Scientists Who Shift Blame for 
Obesity Away From Bad Diets, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2015), http://well.blogs.nytimes.
com/2015/08/09/coca-cola-funds-scientists-who-shift-blame-for-obesity-away-from-
bad-diets/ [https://perma.cc/Y4TU-EZ29]. 
 85. Id. 
 86. O’Connor, supra note 11. 
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Association (then called the Sugar Research Association) paid 
Harvard scientists in 1967 to publish a review on sugar, fat, and heart 
disease to debunk contemporaneous anti-sugar studies in Europe 
conducted by sugar critic, John Yudkin.87  The industry-funded 
research was likely in response to Yudkin’s88 research and 
experiments surrounding the health effects of sugar consumption, 
including higher triglyceride levels associated with heart disease and 
increased insulin levels directly linked with type 2 diabetes.89  
Realizing that this research could threaten the sugar industry, John 
Hickson, a top executive in the sugar industry, proposed disputing the 
worrying findings on sugar with industry-funded research.90 
In addition to research funding, the uncovered documents suggest 
that the researchers were in relatively close contact with executives 
while conducting the studies.91  The hired scientists shared and 
reviewed early drafts with sugar industry executives, and Hickson 
himself expressed satisfaction with the content of their presented 
writings.92  One of the researchers even assured Hickson that “[w]e 
are well aware of your particular interest and will cover this as well as 
we can.”93  The particular interest, of course, was to shift public 
opinion and minimize the link between sugar and heart health by 
instead emphasizing the role of fat and saturated fat in cardiovascular 
problems.94 
The industry-funded research successfully minimized the criticism 
of sugar and shifted the focus to fat.95  In 1976, the Sugar Association 
won the Silver Anvil award (a public relations award) for “influencing 
the public opinion about the health effects of sugar consumption.”96  
The industry-funded research was published in the New England 
                                                                                                                 
 87. Id. 
 88. John Yudkin was a leading authority on nutrition in the United Kingdom. 
Taubes, supra note 1, at 5. 
 89. In the mid-1960s, “studies had begun pointing to a relationship between high-
sugar diets and the country’s high rates of heart disease . . . [and a top sugary industry 
executive] proposed countering the alarming findings on sugar with industry-funded 
research.”  Marion Nestle also explained that the recently uncovered documents 
“provided ‘compelling evidence’ that the sugar industry had initiated research 
‘expressly to exonerate sugar as a major risk factor for coronary heart disease.’” 
O’Connor, supra note 11; see also Taubes, supra note 1, at 5. 
 90. O’Connor, supra note 11. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. SUGAR COATED (Michele Hozer 2015). 
 96. Id. 
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Journal of Medicine, a prominent journal that authorities rely on 
when shaping the overall scientific discussion.97  One of the Harvard 
scientists, D. Mark Hedsted, became the head of nutrition at the 
USDA and used the research funded by the sugar industry to 
“influence the government’s dietary recommendations,” emphasizing 
saturated fat as the leading cause of cardiovascular disease while 
identifying sugar as “empty” or benign calories.98  More generally, the 
results of the industry-funded research has had long-term impact for 
both dietary guidelines and general nutrition policy where “[f]or 
many decades, health officials encouraged Americans to reduce their 
fat intake, which led many people to consume low-fat, high-sugar 
foods that some experts now blame for fueling the obesity crisis.”99 
Coca-Cola recently came under criticism for funding scientists who 
shift blame for obesity from bad diets to lack of exercise.100  The 
largest soda company collaborated with influential scientists 
advocating the message, “to maintain a healthy weight, get more 
exercise and worry less about cutting calories,” in journals, at 
conferences, and through social media.101  This message is misleading 
and a thinly veiled attempt by Coca Cola to deflect blame about its 
products’ role in the rise in obesity and type 2 diabetes.102  In fact, 
scientific evidence suggests that exercise has a minimal impact on 
weight when compared with the food people consume.103  Coca-Cola 
is assisting scientists in their advocacy by providing financial and 
logistical support to a new nonprofit organization—the Global 
Energy Balance Network—and donated approximately $1.5 million in 
2014 to start the organization.104  The soda giant has consistently 
characterized the obesity epidemic as an exercise problem (despite 
scientific evidence to the contrary), but now is going one step further 
by “enlisting” respectable scientists to advocate its case.105  Marion 
Nestle sharply criticized Coca-Cola’s actions stating, “[t]he Global 
Energy Balance Network is nothing but a front group for Coca-Cola.  
                                                                                                                 
 97. O’Connor, supra note 11. 
 98. Id. 
 99. O’Connor, supra note 84. 
 100. See generally id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. “Barry M. Popkin, a professor of global nutrition at the University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill, said Coke’s support of prominent health researchers was 
reminiscent of tactics used by the tobacco industry, which enlisted experts to become 
‘merchants of doubt’ about the health hazards of smoking.” Id. 
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Coca-Cola’s agenda here is very clear:  get these researchers to 
confuse the science and deflect attention from dietary intake.”106 
II.  THE BATTLE OF THE BULGE (A/K/A, LOVE HANDLES) 
The current health crisis has not gone unnoticed.  Federal and local 
governments are taking meaningful action to curb obesity rates in the 
United States by targeting the food industry through updated 
nutrition labeling requirements and soda taxes.  Noticing the 
increased public concern and recent government action, some 
companies are being proactive, pledging to reduce the sugar content 
of their products.  Beyond government and industry action, in 2003 
consumers attempted to bring a private action against McDonald’s in 
Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp. in the Southern District of New York.  
The legal community today may study this past attempt to impose 
liability on a food company through obesity litigation—as well as the 
successful litigation brought against tobacco corporations—to 
develop a powerful and successful strategy for future litigation. 
A. Federal Action:  Lobbying and the Existing Revolving Door 
One response to the growing health concerns related to 
overconsumption of soda is increased government regulation of the 
food and beverage industry.  Interest groups, including the American 
Beverage Association (“ABA”),107 as well as individual companies 
such as Coca-Cola and Pepsi, invest significant time and money to 
influence congressional and agency actions.108  Specifically: 
The ABA has lobbied against any government action . . . that might 
raise the cost of soda production and marketing or discourage 
consumption . . . [including] against nutrition labeling, packaging 
standards, fair labor standards, the exclusion of sodas from food 
assistance programs and school meals, limitations on franchises, 
                                                                                                                 
 106. Id. 
 107. The American Beverage Association is: 
[T]he soda industry’s principal trade association, public relations agent, and 
staunch defender . . . . The ABA represents dozens of beverage producers, 
bottlers, distributors, franchise companies, and support industries, but 
bottlers predominate, particularly those connected to Coca-Cola, PepsiCo, 
and Dr. Pepper Snapple.”  The ABA considers itself a neutral party and “a 
liaison between the industry, government, and the public, and a strong voice 
for the industry in legislative and regulatory matters . . . . The ABA lobbies 
aggressively on behalf of the industry and weighs in loudly, forcefully, and 
persistently on a broad range of issues affecting the soda marketing 
environment. 
NESTLE, supra note 2, at 98. 
 108. Id. at 315. 
2017] BIG SODA 1283 
quotas on sugar, container deposit laws, and restrictions on 
television advertising to children, among other issues.109 
In the 2016 election cycle, the food and beverage industry 
contributed over twenty-three billion dollars to campaigns, with 
Coca-Cola as the top contributor with approximately $1.4 billion.110  
In 2016, Coca-Cola, Pepsi, and the ABA combined spent over twelve 
billion dollars in lobbying.111  Among all the companies spending 
money on lobbying within the food and beverage industry, Coca-
Cola, Pepsi, and the ABA rank number one, two, and seven in 
amount spent on lobbying.112  These figures show the soda industry 
takes lobbying seriously, invests significant money into lobbying 
efforts, and employs lobbyists or lobbying firms to “promote soda 
interest to federal or state governments.”113  These lobbyists meet 
with members of both houses in Congress, the White House, and 
various government agencies integral in setting food-related 
regulations including the USDA, Food and Drug Administration 
(“FDA”), and other federal agencies.114  Soda lobbyist groups will 
reach out to government officials to voice the companies’ interest 
when any issue or initiative that may affect soda production, 
marketing, or profitability—regardless of how apparently indirect or 
obscure—is considered.115 
The food and beverage industry sends both its money and its 
professionals into government, through the revolving door.  A 
revolving door describes a strong relationship between the 
                                                                                                                 
 109. Id. (citing CHERYL HARRIS LOFLAND, THE NATIONAL SOFT DRINK 
ASSOCIATION:  A TRADITION OF SERVICE (1986)). 
 110. Ctr. for Responsive Pol., Food & Beverage:  Long-term Contribution Trends, 
OPENSECRETS.ORG, 
http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/totals.php?cycle=2016&ind=N01 
[https://perma.cc/BGD5-WRVP]. 
 111. Ctr. for Responsive Pol., Food & Beverage:  Lobbying, 2016, 
OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/lobbying.php 
[https://perma.cc/8A9F-43JY]. 
 112. Id. 
 113. These organizations and companies increase investment in lobbying when 
particularly relevant issues arise within Congress or agencies. See, e.g., NESTLE, supra 
note 2, at 317 (detailing Coca-Cola’s lobbying expenditures from 2008 to 2009 while 
Congress was considering a soda tax).  Additionally, the American Beverage 
Association has spent millions of dollars challenging and opposing soda tax bills in 
recent years. Roberto A. Ferdman, Why the Sugar Industry Hates the FDA’s New 
Nutrition Facts Label, WASH. POST (May 20, 2016), https://www.washington
post.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/05/20/why-the-sugar-industry-hates-the-fdas-new-
nutrition-facts-label/ [https://perma.cc/4E94-JKH3]. 
 114. NESTLE, supra note 2, at 318. 
 115. Id. at 318-19. 
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government agencies and the industries those agencies are intended 
to regulate, wherein professionals continuously and seamlessly move 
within the industry between the private and public sectors.116  Lester 
Crawford, the head of the FDA, was formerly the Executive Vice 
President of the National Food Processors Association.117  In 2006, 
Lester Crawford pleaded guilty to “conflict of interest and false 
reporting of information about stocks he owned in food, beverage, 
and medical device companies he was in charge of regulating.”118  
More generally, many Big Soda lobbyists formerly held positions 
within government, as legislative aides, research directors, staff 
assistants, or advisors to various governmental actors, ranging from 
Members of Congress to key advisory roles within federal agencies.119  
When former government officials become lobbyists, they bring “an 
intimate knowledge of how the system operates, connections to 
leaders and staff of both political parties, and a vast address book of 
personal contacts accumulated on their jobs.”120  Such close 
relationships present conflicts of interest when former government 
officials use their familiarity with the system to further the interests of 
the same industry they previously regulated.121  Within the revolving 
door structure of the food and beverage industry, there is also the risk 
that government agencies creating and enforcing regulations affecting 
the food and beverage industry may become “captured” by these 
professionals who previously worked for food or soda corporations, 
and who may return to their former employees.122 
From the significant spending on lobbying efforts, as well as the 
revolving door effect creating a close and intimate relationship 
between the food and beverage industry and governmental actors, it 
                                                                                                                 
 116. Id. at 319. 
 117. Additionally, the Chief of Staff at the USDA was the former chief lobbyist to 
the beef industry.  These examples of a revolving door structure provide evidence of 
regulatory agencies being controlled by the companies they are meant to regulate and 
scrutinize. FOOD, INC., supra note 28. 
 118. Andrew Bridges, Ex-FDA Chief Pleads Guilty in Stock Case, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (Oct. 17, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/
10/17/AR2006101700573_pf.html [https://perma.cc/SU7L-JJB7]. 
 119. NESTLE, supra note 2, at 319-20. 
 120. Id. at 320. 
 121. Id. at 319. 
 122. See, e.g., O’Connor, supra note 11 (“One of the scientists who was paid by the 
sugar industry [to conduct research downplaying a link between sugar and heart 
disease and promote saturated fat as the cause] was D. Mark Hegsted, who went on 
to become the head of nutrition at the U.S.D.A., where in 1977 he helped draft the 
forerunner to the federal government’s dietary guidelines.”). See generally FOOD, 
INC., supra note 28. 
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is clear that conflicts of interests can compromise effective policy and 
regulation.123 
B. Successful Federal Regulation:  The FDA Takes Action 
In May 2016, the Food and Drug Administration took a big step 
toward increased regulation in the interest of consumer protection 
within the food industry by updating the Nutrition Facts label for the 
first time in over twenty years.124  The new label requires packaged 
foods to list the amount of sugar added by the manufacturer and the 
percentage of the daily recommended consumption of added sugar 
(see figure below).125 
The FDA attempted to update the Nutrition Facts in 2014, but 
faced strong opposition from General Mills and the Grocery 
Manufacturers Association.126  Following the 2016 announcement, the 
Grocery Manufacturers Association welcomed the new labeling 
                                                                                                                 
 123. Documents from the 1960s demonstrated the significant role of the food 
industry in recommending the American diet. See generally Ferdman, supra note 
113. 
 124. See Lisa Baertlein, New U.S. Food Label Rules to Require Added Sugars to 
be Detailed, REUTERS (May 20, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-fda-
nutritionlabel-idUSKCN0YB1OF [https://perma.cc/YER6-TQ3S]; see also Ferdman, 
supra note 113. 
 125. See Annie Gasparro & Mike Esterl, FDA Approves New Nutrition Panel 
That Highlights Sugar Levels, WALL ST. J. (May 20, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/fda-approves-controversial-changes-to-nutrition-facts-panel-1463750195 
[https://perma.cc/NKY6-QQ3X]. 
 126. See Dan Charles, An “Added Sugar” Label Is On The Way for Packaged 
Food, NPR (May 20, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2016/05/20/478837
157/the-added-sugar-label-is-coming-to-a-packaged-food-near-you 
[https://perma.cc/L2VQ-NLEE]. 
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requirements, while the Sugar Association criticized it, claiming it will 
only confuse consumers and vilify the food and beverage industry.127  
The updated labeling requirements will affect approximately 800,000 
products ranging from Coca-Cola to yogurt and pasta sauce.128  
Furthermore, updating the labels will cost food and beverage 
manufacturers about two billion dollars, but is estimated to benefit 
the consumer between twenty and thirty billion dollars by reducing 
the costs of treating obesity-related health issues.129 
Beyond the fiscal burden imposed on the manufacturers and food 
and beverage industry by the new FDA labeling requirements, it is 
unclear what effect the new labels will truly have on consumers’ 
purchasing and eating habits.  Some advocacy groups and individuals 
praise the labeling changes as a necessary development to enable 
consumers to make more informed choices and to encourage food 
manufacturers to reduce the amount of sugar used.130  The food 
industry, however, emphasizes that added sugar and natural sugar 
have the same effect on weight gain, and therefore distinguishing 
between the two types of sugar through labeling is unnecessary and 
will only confuse the consumer.131  Professor Jeremy Kees, a nutrition 
label expert at Villanova University School of Business, concludes 
that consumers respond more to front of package labeling changes, 
and believes the impact of the nutritional label change will be 
relatively small.132  Despite label placement, the contents of the labels 
may have a particularly large impact on the soda industry—a twelve 
ounce can of Coca Cola would show thirty-nine grams of sugar, 
amounting to approximately 156 and 108 percent of a recommended 
daily intake for women and men, respectively.133  Considering that 
Coca Cola derives seventy percent of its sales from carbonated soft 
drinks, the soda industry leader has significant stakes in how added 
sugar is perceived in its products.134  The pressure from federal 
                                                                                                                 
 127. Id. 
 128. See Baertlein, supra note 124. 
 129. In 2008, the annual medical cost of obesity was $147 billion. Id.  Another 
article indicates “[t]he FDA estimates that implementing the change will cost the 
food and beverage industry roughly $500 million a year, while providing 
approximately $2 billion annually in benefits such as reduced health costs, over 20 
years.” Gasparro & Esterl, supra note 125. 
 130. See Charles, supra note 126.  Additionally, Marion Nestle, a professor of 
nutrition and food studies at NYU, has called the FDA announcement a huge win for 
the consumer. See Ferdman, supra note 113. 
 131. See Gasparro & Esterl, supra note 125. 
 132. See Baertlein, supra note 124. 
 133. See Charles, supra note 126. 
 134. See Gasparro & Esterl, supra note 125. 
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agencies may ultimately push the major food manufacturers to 
reformulate their products and substantially reduce the amount of 
added sugar.135 
C. Local Governments Take Action 
Even if government action on the federal level may be ineffective 
to enact meaningful change, cities have attempted to address the 
health issues posed by excessive consumption of sugary soda 
beverages in a number of ways.  In 2012, New York City approved the 
Sugary Drinks Portion Cap Rule proposed by Mayor Michael 
Bloomberg, a ban on sodas of a certain size.136  After a contentious 
and well-publicized legal battle, the highest court in the state of New 
York, the Court of Appeals, invalidated the ban.137  More recently, 
Philadelphia became the first major United States city to pass a tax on 
soda and other high-sugary beverages.138  Although California courts 
upheld a similar provision in Berkeley for combating sugar 
consumption from soft drinks,139 the Philadelphia soda tax is currently 
being challenged in the Pennsylvania courts.140 
1. New York City Soda Ban 
In May 2012, New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg proposed 
the Sugary Drinks Portion Cap Rule and the New York City Board of 
Health passed the rule in September 2012.141  The rule “prohibit[ed] 
food-services establishments that are subject to the city’s health 
department from selling sodas and other sugary drinks in containers 
                                                                                                                 
 135. Id. 
 136. See Hery (Michelle) Min, Note, Large-Sized Soda Ban as an Alternative to 
Soda Tax, 23 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 187, 190 (2013). 
 137. See generally N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hisp. Chambers of Com. v. N.Y.C. 
Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, 16 N.E.3d 538 (N.Y. 2014). 
 138. See generally Michael Burke, Philadelphia Becomes First Major City to Pass 
Soda Tax, USA TODAY (June 16, 2016), http://www.usatoday.com/story/
news/2016/06/16/philadelphia-becomes-first-major-city-pass-soda-tax/85999128/ 
[https://perma.cc/4669-8BVT]. 
 139. See Dan Charles, Berkeley’s Soda Tax Appears to Cut Consumption Of 
Sugary Drinks, NPR (Aug. 23, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2016/08/
23/491104093/berkeleys-soda-tax-appears-to-cut-consumption-of-sugary-drinks 
[https://perma.cc/6L5R-TW9N]. 
 140. See generally Dan Packel, Philly Defends Soda Tax Against Beverage 
Groups’ Challenge, LAW360 (Oct. 11, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/
850051/philly-defends-soda-tax-against-beverage-groups-challenge 
[https://perma.cc/F7QS-CBKV]; Stephen St. Vincent, Is the Soda Tax Legal?, PHILA. 
CITIZEN (June 15, 2016), http://thephiladelphiacitizen.org/is-philadelphia-soda-tax-
legal/ [https://perma.cc/6WUT-DNT9]. 
 141. Min, supra note 136, at 190. 
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larger than sixteen ounces.”142  This type of restriction was 
unprecedented in the United States, but it was ultimately struck down 
by New York’s Court of Appeals.143  The court invalidated the ban on 
two primary grounds.  First, the court found that the New York City 
Board of Health lacked the authority to impose the ban, because only 
the legislative branch—in New York City, the City Council—has the 
authority to make policy.144  The court explained that the ban was an 
effort “to promote a healthy diet without significantly affecting the 
beverage industry . . . . [t]he value judgments entailed difficult and 
complex choices between broad policy goals—choices reserved to the 
legislative branch.”145  Second, the ban was arbitrary and capricious, 
largely due to its seemingly subjective exclusions.146  The current de 
Blasio Administration was disappointed by the ruling,147 and reports 
from 2014 indicated the administration was exploring other ways to 
regulate large sodas.148  Although the de Blasio Administration held 
                                                                                                                 
 142. See id. (citing Vivian Yee, Your Guide to New York’s Soda Ban, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 11, 2013), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/11/your-guide-to-new-
yorks-soda-ban/ [https://perma.cc/J8WQ-3CQR]); see also Jill Colvin, New York 
Soda Ban Approved:  Board of Health Oks Limiting Sale of Large-Sized, Sugary 
Drinks, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 13, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/
09/13/new-york-approves-soda-ban-big-sugary-drinks_n_1880868.html 
[https://perma.cc/F3G9-RCFL]; Michael M. Grynbaum, Soda Makers Begin Their 
Push Against New York Ban, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/07/02/nyregion/in-fight-against-nyc-soda-ban-industry-focuses-on-personal-
choice.html [https://perma.cc/Q6JK-4W49]. 
 143. The New York Supreme Court invalidated the soda ban on two grounds—(1) 
that the agency did not possess policy-making authority under Boreali and (2) that 
the soda ban regulation was arbitrary and capricious.  However, the First Department 
of the New York Appellate Division only discussed the authority under Boreali, and 
therefore the New York Court of Appeals specifically rejected the ban due to the 
agency’s lack of authority to pass policy-making regulations.  Rather, under Boreali, 
policy-making is restricted to the legislative power. See Boreali v. Axelrod, 517 
N.E.2d 1350 (N.Y. 1987). 
 144. See id.; see also Chris Dolmetsch, New York Big-Soda Ban Rejected by 
State’s Highest Court, BLOOMBERG (June 26, 2014), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2014-06-26/new-york-big-soda-ban-rejected-by-n-y-top-court-as-
overreach. 
 145. N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hisp. Chambers of Com. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & 
Mental Hygiene, 16 N.E.3d 538, 547 (N.Y. 2014). 
 146. The regulation excluded some state-regulated businesses, such as convenience 
stores, and did not apply to other high-sugary beverages.  Dolmetsch, supra note 144; 
see also N.Y. Statewide Coal., 16 N.E.3d at 546, 560. 
 147. In response to news that the ban was improperly promulgated and would not 
be reinstated “City Council Speaker Melissa Mark-Viverito said lawmakers would 
consider a ban on large soft-drink servings if de Blasio seeks one.” Dolmetsch, supra 
note 144. 
 148. Michael Howard Saul, Forward Push on Soda Ban:  De Blasio Administration 
Considers New Ways to Cap Sugary Drinks, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 16, 2014), 
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“high-level” meetings with beverage industry executives and public 
health advocates in 2014,149 no meaningful policy or legislation is 
being pursued at this time. 
2. Philadelphia Soda Tax 
In June 2016, Philadelphia became the first major city in the United 
States to pass a soda tax.150  The Philadelphia City Council passed the 
new tax by a thirteen to four vote, imposing a 1.5 cent per ounce tax 
on sodas and other sugary beverages.151  Of note, this new soda tax 
would be in addition to the eight percent sales tax already applied to 
soda in Pennsylvania.152  The tax will impact both regular and diet 
beverages,153 while milk, baby formula, and beverages that contain 
over fifty percent fruit or vegetables are exempt.154  The tax went into 
effect on January 1, 2017, and is expected to raise ninety-one million 
dollars annually.155  According to Mayor Jim Kenney, the revenue 
from this new tax will go back to communities with the greatest need 
by expanding pre-kindergarten programs in the city, creating 
community schools, and developing community resources, including 
parks, recreation centers, and libraries.156 
Although the tax passed with a clear majority in the City Council, it 
was criticized and challenged throughout the process.  The ABA 
                                                                                                                 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/new-york-city-mayor-bill-de-blasio-pushes-forward-on-
soda-ban-1413421275 [https://perma.cc/9D7U-VDSL]. 
 149. Id. 
 150. While Philadelphia is held out to be the first major United States city to pass 
the soda tax, Berkeley, California was the first city in the United States to impose a 
soda tax in 2014. Burke, supra note 138.  Furthermore, attempts to pass similar soda 
tax proposals have failed in over thirty states in recent years. Dann Cuellar, 
Philadelphia City Council Passes Beverage Tax with 13-4 Vote, 6ABC NEWS (June 17, 
2016), http://6abc.com/news/philadelphia-city-council-passes-beverage-tax-/1388228/ 
[https://perma.cc/EQY4-XMUM]. 
 151. Burke, supra note 138. 
 152. Soda is classified as a food for taxation purposes, but is not exempt from sales 
tax in the state of Pennsylvania. Jeanne Sahadi & Aaron Smith, Philadelphia Passes a 
Soda Tax, CNN MONEY (June 16, 2016), http://money.cnn.com/2016/06/16/pf/taxes/
philadelphia-passes-a-soda-tax/ [https://perma.cc/6RT9-AAS9]. 
 153. Cuellar, supra note 150. 
 154. Tricia L. Nadolny, Soda Tax Passes; Philadelphia is First Big City in Nation to 
Enact One, PHILLY.COM (June 16, 2016), http://www.philly.com/philly/news/politics/
20160617_Philadelphia_City_Council_to_vote_on_soda_tax.html 
[https://perma.cc/69DT-YR7X]. 
 155. Sahadi & Smith, supra note 152. 
 156. Nadolny, supra note 154.  While the health benefit motivations seem 
apparent, Mayor Kenney focused on public interest issues when making the 
argument to tax sugary drinks.  He noted that any health benefits resulting from the 
tax would be a bonus. Cuellar, supra note 150. 
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spent nearly five million dollars on advertisements opposing the tax, 
while a non-profit created in support of the initiative spent a little 
over two million dollars.157  Critics of the tax emphasized its 
regressive nature and claimed it was discriminatory and would 
disproportionately impact poor and working class families.158  In 
response, proponents emphasized the reinvestment of revenue raised 
from the tax back into the city, ultimately lifting poor Philadelphians 
out of poverty.159 
The group Philadelphians Against the Grocery Tax and the 
powerful ABA quickly took legal action against the tax,160 and Mayor 
Kenney was prepared for the legal battle.161  The complaint alleged 
that the Philadelphia soda tax was illegal, because (1) it violated 
Pennsylvania’s conformity clause; (2) the tax was preempted by the 
state’s power over sales tax and the soda tax on top of the sales tax 
constituted illegal double taxation; and (3) the city cannot tax items 
that may be purchased through SNAP [colloquially, food stamp] 
benefits.162 
Of the three claims, the strongest challenge to the tax is that the tax 
is a sales tax and thus is preempted by state law.163  In Pennsylvania, 
the state levies sales taxes, already taxes soda, and therefore the 
additional city tax “runs counter to a state law preventing a local 
government from taxing the same subject of property as an existing 
state law.”164  The City contended that sales taxes are imposed on 
tangible property and services, while the current soda tax “is levied 
on the wholesale distribution of sweetened beverages when they 
                                                                                                                 
 157. Of the two million dollars spent by the non-profit, $1.6 million came from 
former New York City Mayor, Michael Bloomberg, who is a strong proponent of 
public health as it relates to soda consumption.  In response to the successful passage 
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 158. Burke, supra note 138. 
 159. Nadolny, supra note 154. 
 160. Burke, supra note 138. 
 161. Nadolny, supra note 154. 
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PHILLY.COM (Dec. 19, 2016), http://www.philly.com/philly/news/20161220_Soda_
tax_lawsuit_dismissed.html [https://perma.cc/9ZUV-MCUP]. 
 163. Packel, supra note 140. 
 164. Id. Arguing the soda tax is a sales tax is ultimately asserting a state 
preemption argument.  Because the state already imposes a sales tax, including a 
sales tax on soda, “Philadelphia cannot legally impose a[n additional] sales tax 
without approval from Republican dominated Harrisburg, which has often received 
tax proposals coolly.” Ryan Briggs, A Legal Challenge to Soda Tax Pops Up, CITY & 
ST. PA (June 8, 2016), http://www.cityandstatepa.com/content/legal-challenge-soda-
tax-pops [https://perma.cc/WL9H-9KJG]. 
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come into the city, is assessed based on volume, and is paid by the 
distributor.”165  The City further asserted that any concerns that the 
tax would eventually be passed on to the consumer are “legally 
irrelevant.”166 
The plaintiffs also claim that the tax violated Pennsylvania’s 
Uniformity Clause.  Article VIII of the Pennsylvania Constitution 
states, “[a]ll taxes shall be uniform, upon the same class of subjects, 
within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax, and shall 
be levied and collected under general laws.”167  This clause requires 
that goods belonging to the same class must be taxed at the same rate, 
and the complaint alleged that the tax violated the Pennsylvania 
Constitution because it is assessed on the volume, not the value or 
price, of the item.168  The City responded that sugared and 
unsweetened beverages are separate classes, and therefore the 
uniformity clause did not apply.169  Furthermore, because the soda tax 
is not a property tax, the City claimed it is within its right to tax the 
beverages based on volume or quantity, rather than volume alone.170 
                                                                                                                 
 165. Packel, supra note 140. 
 166. Id.  While perhaps not legally relevant, the fact that the tax represents a 
regressive tax that will disproportionately impact low-income residents certainly 
represents a socially relevant concern asserted by critics, as noted above. Burke, 
supra note 138. 
 167. PA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1. 
 168. Packel, supra note 140; St. Vincent, supra note 140.  Plaintiffs’ Complaint 
alleges the soda tax violates the uniform clause in four ways:   
First, the Tax is imposed on the class of soft drinks in a non-uniform way 
based solely on volume, not value—at both the distributor wholesale level 
and the consumer market price level—in contravention of long-standing 
precedent precluding such a non-value based method of calculation of taxes 
on property (such as soft drinks).  Second, the Tax is imposed on 
distributors in an unequal and unreasonable way because the Tax is much 
greater on large, inexpensive products than on small, more expensive 
products.  Third, the Tax is imposed on retailers in an unequal and 
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Fourth, the burden of the Tax is borne by consumers in unreasonably 
disparate ways.  The amount of the Tax borne by the consumer is less on a 
percentage basis for small, more expensive products and wildly higher for 
large, less expensive products.   
Complaint at 5, Williams v. City of Philadelphia (Phila. Ct. C.P. 2016) (No. 1452). 
 169. Briggs, supra note 164. 
 170. Packel, supra note 140. 
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The Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas dismissed the plaintiffs’ 
case entirely, rejecting these arguments; however, the parties 
challenging the tax quickly filed an appeal.171  While the soda tax has 
been implemented throughout Philadelphia, its legality is still under 
scrutiny.  The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court has granted an 
expedited appeal and arguments are expected to begin in early April 
2017.172 
D. Self-Regulation Within the Industry 
Perhaps the growing public concern surrounding high-sugar 
beverages, such as soda, exemplified by new FDA labeling 
requirements and potential city taxation of soda beverages, has 
prompted the industry to take action through self-regulation.173  On 
October 17, 2016, Pepsi announced it would cut the sugar content and 
calories of its products worldwide in response to the most recent 
World Health Organization dietary guidelines.174  Specifically, Pepsi 
plans to cut calories from added sugar to less than 100 calories in two-
thirds of its single serving drinks by the year 2025.175  The chairman 
and CEO of Pepsi partially credited this new pledge to advances in 
technology that will enable companies to make equally tasty products 
without the same levels of sugar, resulting in “lower sweetness levels” 
for the consumer.176  Pepsi did not indicate specifically which 
products would be seeing the reduction in sugar content or how the 
reduction would impact the production and marketing of the regular 
Pepsi formula and, considering the wide range of products produced 
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 173. See, e.g., Aubrey, supra note 1 (noting Dr. William Dietz’s observation that 
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sugary drinks). 
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JULG] [hereinafter PepsiCo Press Release]; see also Aubrey, supra note 1. 
 175. See PepsiCo Press Release.  These products include Gatorade, Pepsi, 
Mountain Dew, and Tropicana (among others). Abby Norman, Pepsi Will Cut the 
Amount of Sugar in Its Sodas, & It’s a Small Step Forward, ROMPER (Oct. 18, 2016), 
https://www.romper.com/p/pepsi-will-cut-the-amount-of-sugar-in-its-sodas-its-a-
small-step-forward-20664 [http://perma.cc/FVR9-WG4M]. 
 176. Norman, supra note 175. 
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by Pepsi,177 the number of soda products impacted by the pledge 
remains unclear.178  Pepsi’s announcement and sugar reduction 
pledge is the first instance of a soda company taking potentially 
meaningful steps to reduce the amount of sugar in its products.  Coca-
Cola and the Dr. Pepper Snapple Group (along with Pepsi) pledged 
to reduce the American caloric consumption of sugary drink by an 
average of twenty percent by 2025 at the Clinton Global Initiative’s 
annual conference in September 2014,179 but other than Pepsi’s 2016 
announcement, no other company has made specific promises to 
accomplish the goal of reducing sugar consumption through soda (or 
other sugary beverages).180 
E. Consumer Product Liability Law 
When regulations are inadequate to hold large corporations 
accountable, citizens may become a sort of private attorney general 
by bringing private suits against large companies for defective 
products.  One potential approach to challenging companies creating 
unhealthy products is to file a civil claim under product liability law.  
The Third Restatement of Torts assigns liability to manufacturers for 
three types of product defects.  First, the product manufacturer is 
liable for injury caused by defects or production flaws, which occur 
when “the product departs from its intended design even though all 
possible care was exercised in the preparation and marketing of the 
product.”181  The second is design defects, wherein “the foreseeable 
risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or 
avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design . . . and the 
omission of the alternative design renders the product not reasonably 
safe.”182  Manufacturers are ultimately liable for design defects, 
because there is an element of the product that is inherently and 
unreasonably dangerous.183  The final defect is in the information or 
warning provided to the customer, or lack thereof.184  A manufacturer 
                                                                                                                 
 177. Brands You Love, PEPSICO, http://www.pepsico.com/brands [http://perma.cc/
5M8G-VLXR]. 
 178. PepsiCo Press Release, supra note 174. 
 179. Saul, supra note 148. 
 180. While Coca-Cola and the Dr. Pepper Snapple Group may have made vague 
promises in 2014, Dr. William Dietz, a preventative health expert at George 
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 181. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PROD. LIAB. § 2 (1998). 
 182. Id. 
 183. Romero, supra note 4, at 245. 
 184. Id. 
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is liable for warning defects “when products become unreasonably 
dangerous because ‘no information explains their use or warns of 
their dangers.’”185  If manufacturers include adequate labels properly 
warning consumers of the potential dangers posed by the product, 
then the product is considered reasonably safe.186  When assigning 
potential liability to soda companies, the two relevant product 
liability claims are design defect and failure to warn. 
Courts have adopted a number of approaches when considering 
design defects in product liability law.  One approach is the consumer 
expectation (or unreasonably dangerous) test where the court 
determines a product’s design defect in relation to the consumer’s 
expectation of safety.187  Under this analysis, a defectively designed 
product is one which “at the time it leaves the seller’s hands [is] in a 
condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer [and] which 
will be unreasonably dangerous to him.”188  Furthermore, the 
defective product “must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which 
would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, 
with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its 
characteristics.”189  A second approach is the risk-utility, or risk-
benefit, test.  This test “requires the trier of fact to weigh such factors 
as the risks of harm, the benefits or utility of the chosen design, and 
the burden of taking precautions against that harm, to determine 
whether the product was unreasonably unsafe or dangerous in 
design.”190  Some courts have adopted a hybrid test that “requires the 
trier of fact to consider risk-benefit factors in deciding what a 
reasonable consumer expects.”191 
The other relevant defect in product liability law is failure to warn, 
when the manufacturer fails to provide sufficient warning to the 
                                                                                                                 
 185. Id. at 245-46. 
 186. Id. at 246. 
 187. JOHN S. ALLEE ET AL., PROD. LIAB. § 2.05(2)(a) (2016); Mary Griffin, The 
Smoldering Issue in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.:  Process Concerns in 
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 191. Id. at § 2.05(2)(c). 
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consumer regarding the inherent risks of the product’s typical use.192  
While “most courts have held that the basic standard of responsibility 
is negligence and that the manufacturer’s duty is to use due care in 
warning of dangers it ‘knew or should have known’ to exist,” a 
number of other courts simply assume the defendants knew the risks 
of harm, eliminating this requirement altogether.193  Some plaintiffs 
have attempted to apply these product liability standards to food 
products, but to little avail.  Part III further discusses the potential 
application of product liability to soda products. 
F. Obesity Litigation:  Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp. 
In 2003, the Southern District of New York decided the seminal 
case involving obesity litigation in Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp.194  In 
Pelman, the plaintiffs, two minors and their parents on their behalf, 
filed multiple claims against McDonald’s for allegedly causing them 
to become obese, thus causing a multitude of health problems.195  The 
plaintiffs filed five claims against McDonald’s.  Counts one and two 
alleged McDonald’s violated New York State consumer protection 
law and engaged in deceptive trade practices by creating unhealthy 
products, not fully disclosing the ingredients or health effects of 
consuming the product, and using marketing to entice customers to 
buy the products without disclosure of the risks.196  Count two 
specifically criticized McDonald’s marketing to children.197  Plaintiffs’ 
counts three through five asserted negligence claims against 
McDonald’s.198   
Judge Sweet in his decision ultimately rejected the plaintiffs’ claims 
for a variety of reasons.  Counts one and two had alleged McDonald’s 
violated the New York Consumer Protection Act.199  For a successful 
claim of deceptive practices, the plaintiff must show:  “(1) that the act, 
                                                                                                                 
 192. Id. at § 2.05(3). 
 193. Id. 
 194. See Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).  The 
Court considered these arguments during a procedural 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for 
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 195. Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d 512. 
 196. Id. at 520, 527. 
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 199. Id. at 524.  New York General Business Law § 349 makes “[d]eceptive acts or 
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N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 350 (McKinney 2017)). 
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practice or advertisement was consumer-orientated; (2) that the act, 
practice or advertisement was misleading in a material respect, and 
(3) that the plaintiff was injured as a result of the deceptive practice, 
act or advertisement.”200  To determine whether an act or practice 
was misleading, the court used an objective standard, demanding 
evidence that a “reasonable consumer would have been misled by the 
defendant’s conduct.”201  The court rejected count one, because the 
plaintiffs did not identify a single instance of deceptive acts.202  
Specifically, plaintiffs failed to identify an advertisement where 
McDonald’s claimed that its products could be eaten on a daily basis 
without any risk of health consequences.203  The court also rejected 
the claims in count two, because the plaintiffs failed to present a 
single specific advertisement, promotion, or statement targeting 
minor consumers.204 
In count three, plaintiffs claimed that McDonald’s products were 
inherently dangerous due to the high levels of cholesterol, fat, salt, 
and sugar; however, McDonald’s defended its products by noting 
public awareness of these nutritional facts.205  McDonald’s also 
pointed to the Restatement (Second) of Torts emphasis that no 
product can be entirely safe for all consumption.206  For plaintiffs’ 
                                                                                                                 
 200. Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 525. 
 201. Id. (citing Marcus v. AT&T, 138 F.3d 46, 64 (2d Cir. 1998); Oswego Laborers’ 
Local 214 Pension Fund v. Marine Midland Bank, 647 N.E.2d 741 (N.Y. 1995)). 
 202. The plaintiffs identified only two potentially deceptive advertising 
campaigns—“McChicken Everyday!” and “Big N’ Tasty Everyday”—and a 
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 203. Id. at 528. 
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 205. Id. at 531. 
 206. Id. at 531-32 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, cmt. i, which 
explains unreasonably dangerous:  “The rule stated in this Section applies only where 
the defective condition of the product makes it unreasonably dangerous to the user 
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from over-consumption.  Ordinary sugar is a deadly poison to diabetics, and castor oil 
found use under Mussolini as an instrument of torture.  That is not what is meant by 
‘unreasonably dangerous’ in this Section.  The article sold must be dangerous to an 
extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who 
purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its 
characteristics.  Good whiskey is not unreasonably dangerous merely because it will 
make some people drunk, and is especially dangerous to alcoholics; but bad whiskey, 
containing a dangerous amount of fuel oil, is unreasonably dangerous.  Good tobacco 
is not unreasonably dangerous merely because the effects of smoking may be 
harmful; but tobacco containing something like marijuana may be unreasonably 
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count three to survive the motion to dismiss, it needed to “allege 
either that the attributes of McDonald’s products are so 
extraordinarily unhealthy that they are outside the reasonable 
contemplation of the consuming public or that the products are so 
extraordinarily unhealthy as to be dangerous in their intended use.”207  
While the complaint alleged the food contains high levels of 
cholesterol, fat, salt, and sugar, the court found that it did not clear 
the necessary bar.208  The court emphasized the common knowledge 
that McDonald’s products contain these nutritional elements.209 
The court then addressed plaintiffs’ count four, the failure to warn 
of the unhealthy attributes of McDonald’s products.  In evaluating 
duty to warn claims, New York law considers the “feasibility and 
difficulty of issuing warnings in the circumstances . . . ; obviousness of 
the risk from actual use of the product; knowledge of the particular 
product user; and proximate cause.”210  There are two situations that 
bar a showing of proximate cause in duty to warn cases—obviousness 
of the risk of harm and the knowledgeable user.211  Plaintiffs in 
Pelman failed to allege that the McDonald’s products consumed by 
the minors were dangerous in a way that was not “open and obvious,” 
meaning “the risks were sufficiently obvious to the user without a 
warning.”212  Finally, the court rejected plaintiffs’ count five, alleging 
the sale of addictive products as overly vague, because it lacked 
specific facts as to what about McDonald’s products makes them 
addictive.213  Plaintiffs also failed to provide evidence suggesting 
McDonald’s purposely created addictive products.214  Ultimately, 
Judge Sweet granted defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint in 
its entirety, but granted leave for the plaintiffs to amend the 
complaint to address the deficiencies identified within the opinion.215 
Although the plaintiffs failed to survive a 12(b)(6) motion in 
Pelman, that does not mean that potential litigation against large food 
or beverage corporations is not possible in the future.  In fact, Judge 
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 207. Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 532. 
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Sweet’s decision in Pelman may have opened the door for litigation 
by providing the precise information and evidence necessary for a 
successful claim.  First, if plaintiffs seek consumer protection claims, 
they must present specific instances where the defendant corporation 
or manufacturer created and disseminated deceptive advertising 
expressly claiming its products were healthy for the consumer or 
would actively assist the consumer lose weight.  Second, plaintiffs will 
face significant challenges bringing common law negligence claims 
against fast food corporations, because it is well-known among the 
public and consumers that such food is unhealthy and 
overconsumption carries significant health risks.  If consumers 
attempt food litigation against the food and beverage industry, other 
than specifically fast food restaurants, consumers should consider 
whether the health risks are common knowledge.  If, however, the 
health risks are not well known, and have potentially been 
downplayed by the food and beverage industry itself, consumers may 
have a more persuasive claim than in Pelman. 
G. Tobacco Litigation 
Although recent consumer products liability claims against a fast 
food corporation have been unsuccessful,216 consumers have 
prevailed in claims against large corporations who create dangerous 
products, specifically against tobacco and cigarette companies.  
Tobacco litigation is now considered one of the successful mass tort 
litigations brought against large corporations; however, this was not 
always the case.  Tobacco companies prevailed in the early cases 
primarily because plaintiffs lacked sufficient scientific evidence 
proving there was a link between their diseases and smoking 
cigarettes.217  However, big tobacco’s early success came to an end in 
the 1988 New Jersey case, Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.218  In 
Cipollone, the jury awarded Antonio Cipollone $400,000 in damages 
for the death of his wife, Rose Cipollone, who died from cancer 
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the Floodgates of Cigarette Litigation Open?, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 1021, 1022 (1989).  
Some plaintiffs failed in early tobacco litigation cases because plaintiffs had 
contributed to their own health problems, while other plaintiffs simply could not 
afford the lengthy and expensive court battles. See id. at 1022-23. 
 218. 693 F. Supp. 208 (D.N.J. 1988), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 893 F.2d 541 (3d 
Cir. 1990), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 505 U.S. 504 (1992); Jacobson, supra note 221, 
at 1023.  This was the first court to award a monetary judgment for injuries caused by 
smoking cigarettes. Id. 
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caused by smoking cigarettes.219  The jury found Liggett Group liable 
because the cigarette company failed to warn consumers of the risks 
of smoking before 1966 and breached its express warranty that the 
cigarettes were safe.220  Cipollone was also the first case where 
plaintiffs introduced evidence showing the cigarette companies 
conspired to prevent third parties from providing information about 
the health hazards cigarettes posed.221 
Under strict product liability the plaintiff does not need to prove 
that the defendants were negligent “or otherwise at fault for the harm 
caused by the product.”222  Rather, the plaintiff must only prove that 
“the manufacturer sold its product in a defective or dangerous 
condition.”223  When determining whether the manufacturer in fact 
sold a product that was in a defective or dangerous condition, many 
jurisdictions have adopted the risk-utility test explained above.224  
Specifically, in the cases preceding Cipollone, as well as the New 
Jersey court in Cipollone, courts analyzed cigarette companies’ 
liability under a risk-utility analysis.225  The risk-utility test balances 
the risks of the potentially dangerous products against the product’s 
benefit to decide whether a product is unreasonably dangerous or 
defective.  “Under [the] utility test the product is defective only if the 
magnitude of the potential hazards outweighs the utility or other 
benefits of the product.”226 
In Cipollone, the plaintiffs asked the court to find that cigarettes 
were so inherently dangerous and provided so little utility, that the 
cigarette was a defective product.227  In so doing, the Cipollone court 
                                                                                                                 
 219. Jacobson, supra note 221, at 1023.  As factual background, Rose Cipollone 
began smoking cigarettes when she was sixteen and in 1981 developed a malignant 
tumor in her right lung.  Rose Cipollone had the upper lobe of her lung and then the 
entire right lung removed.  She and her husband filed a suit against the cigarette 
companies who manufactured and sold the cigarettes she had smoked.  The 
complaint alleged that she developed bronchogenic carcinoma as a result of using the 
defendants’ products for over forty years.  During the pretrial procedures, Rose 
Cipollone died of complications from lung cancer, and her husband, Antonio 
Cipollone, continued the case individually and on behalf of his wife’s estate. Id. at 
1043-44. 
 220. Id. at 1023.  The failure to warn claim was prior to 1966, because warning 
labels placed on cigarettes in 1966 in compliance with the FDA’s Federal Cigarette 
Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965 preempted state tort claims. Id. at 1023, 1028. 
 221. Id. at 1023. 
 222. Id. at 1037. 
 223. Id. at 1039 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(A) (1965)). 
 224. Jacobson, supra note 221, at 1039. 
 225. Id. at 1036-40. 
 226. Id. at 1039-40 (citations omitted). 
 227. Griffin, supra note 187, at 607. 
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analyzed the facts under the risk-utility test in a number of ways 
under New Jersey Law.228  First, the court refused to “consider in [its] 
calculus the collateral economic benefits from the manufacture and 
sale of the product.”229  The court held that “the manufacturer’s 
reasonableness in placing the product on the market depends only 
upon the social benefits of cigarettes to the cigarette smoker, and not 
upon the collateral social benefits of cigarette production.”230  The 
second, more challenging piece of the risk-utility test was balancing 
the utility of cigarettes against the risks associated with the product.  
The court reasoned that a plaintiff could “prove a design defect in 
two ways:  (1) prove that the manufacturer was unreasonable because 
it marketed the product as designed instead of using a technologically 
feasible alternative; or (2) when no technologically feasible 
alternative is available, prove the manufacturer was unreasonable in 
selling the product at all.”231  While both analyses compare the 
defendant’s alternative course of conduct, the second approach is 
quantifiably more difficult for a court to determine.232  Comparing a 
specific product to a technologically feasible alternative—such as a 
prior product model, or a new feasible alternative—provides the 
court quantifiable data and evidence to compare, such as increasing 
the cost of a product in order to add a certain safety feature.233  
However, a court comparing an existing product against a 
hypothetical world without the product must consider an 
overwhelming number of competing values without any quantifiable 
data to compare.234 
                                                                                                                 
 228. Under New Jersey tort law, “[t]he elements of a prima facie case for design 
defect are evidence that (1) the product design was defective, (2) the defect existed 
when the defendants distributed the product, and (3) the defect caused injury to a 
reasonably foreseeable user.” Id. at 609. 
 229. Id. at 611-12.  For example, “[i]n analyzing the utility of the handguns the 
court considered only the utility of such handguns to the consumer for recreational 
use or protection, and not production benefits resulting from handgun manufacture 
or sale.” Id. at 612 (citing Moore v. R.G. Indus., 789 F.2d 1326, 1327 (9th Cir. 1986)). 
 230. Griffin, supra note 187, at 613. 
 231. Id. at 615 (citing Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 406 A.2d 140, 150 
(N.J. 1979) (“Did the manufacturer act as a reasonably prudent person by designing 
the item as he did and by placing it on the market in that condition, or should he have 
designed it to incorporate certain safety features or some other modifications?”)). 
 232. Griffin, supra note 187, at 615. 
 233. Id. at 615-22. 
 234. Notably: 
When the plaintiff posits the removal of an entire product line from the 
market, the court cannot focus on one small, incremental change at a time.  
The court can no longer, for example, hold constant the price and relaxation 
benefits of cigarettes and focus solely on the tradeoff between a bitter 
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The Cipollone court also considered the failure to warn claim.235  
The defendants argued that this claim was preempted because 
Congress had passed the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising 
Act of 1965, requiring cigarettes to contain a warning label by 1966.236  
The United States Supreme Court held that the failure to warn claim 
was preempted for injuries occurring after the 1966 label was 
implemented, and the plaintiff was limited to injuries predating the 
federal warning.237  Despite this limitation, the “jury found Liggett to 
be negligent and assigned 20% of the fault for Cipollone’s illness to 
the defendant,” and held the plaintiff eighty percent responsible for 
her injuries through the assumption of risk doctrine.238 
Shortly after Cipollone, the climate of tobacco litigation changed 
significantly.  Plaintiffs began consolidating claims to create class-
action tort challenges to the tobacco industry.239  Beyond plaintiffs’ 
private causes of action, states began “seeking reimbursement from 
tobacco companies for health-related costs associated with 
smoking.”240  These developments occurred as industry documents 
                                                                                                                 
aftertaste and reduced health risks.  The ‘should not have sold any cigarettes 
at all’ alternative brings all the defendants’ design choices into the fray at 
once.  
Id. at 621-22. 
 235. As the court summarized: 
The ‘failure to warn claims’ allege both that the product was ‘defective as a 
result of [respondents’] failure to provide adequate warnings of the health 
consequences of cigarette smoking’ and that respondents ‘were negligent in 
the manner [that] they tested, researched, sold, promoted and advertised’ 
their cigarettes.  The ‘express warranty claims’ allege that respondents had 
‘expressly warranted that smoking the cigarettes which they manufactured 
and sold did not present any significant health consequences.’  The 
‘fraudulent misrepresentation claims’ allege that respondents had willfully, 
‘through their advertising, attempted to neutralize the [federally mandated] 
warning’ labels, and that they had possessed, but had ‘ignored and failed 
to act upon,’ medical and scientific data indicating that ‘cigarettes were 
hazardous to the health of consumers.’  Finally, the ‘conspiracy to defraud 
claims’ allege that respondents conspired to deprive the public of such 
medical and scientific data. 
Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., 505 U.S. 504, 509-10 (1992). 
 236. See generally id.  The required warning label read:  “WARNING:  THE 
SURGEON GENERAL HAS DETERMINED THAT CIGARETTE SMOKING 
IS DANGEROUS TO YOUR HEALTH.” Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 
1969, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (2012). 
 237. Jacobson, supra note 217, at 1046. 
 238. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 512; see also Brooke Courtney, Is Obesity Really the 
Next Tobacco?  Lessons Learned from Tobacco for Obesity Litigation, 15 ANN. 
HEALTH L. 61, 86 (2006). 
 239. Courtney, supra note 238, at 85. 
 240. Id. 
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surfaced and revealed efforts to “conceal and misrepresent tobacco-
related health concerns,” and that tobacco industry executives knew 
of nicotine’s addictive nature.241  Using this newly discovered 
evidence, plaintiffs shifted their focus to the addictive qualities of 
tobacco.242  While the tobacco and cigarette companies previously 
claimed that the health risks associated with smoking cigarettes were 
well-known to the consumer (especially after the Federal Cigarette 
Labeling and Advertising Act) and therefore consumers assumed 
those risks when they voluntarily chose to smoke,243 “the addictive 
character of nicotine was less familiar to smokers than the health 
effects of tobacco.”244  In addition to shifting the focus to nicotine 
addiction, state attorneys general began bringing state health care 
reimbursement claims, beginning with the Mississippi Attorney 
General.245  Mississippi and the other states sought recovery on 
equitable grounds of unjust enrichment, as well as “consumer fraud 
and violations of consumer protection law.”246  Soon, similar 
government lawsuits were filed by almost every state, and the tobacco 
industry avoided significant litigation by settling individually with 
four states and settling with the remaining forty-six states in a $206 
billion master settlement agreement in 1998.247 
III.  THE BITTER TRUTH OF POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 
American consumers should pursue two courses of action to hold 
soda companies accountable for their role in the current obesity and 
health crisis.  First, following the litigation against tobacco and 
cigarette companies, consumers should pursue product liability civil 
actions.  Second, consumers should pursue legislative action on the 
local and state levels to encourage cities and states to adopt a per 
                                                                                                                 
 241. Id. at 87 (citing Robert L. Rabin, The Third Wave of Tobacco Tort Litigation, 
in REGULATING TOBACCO 176, 179, 183 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman 
eds., 2001)). 
 242. Courtney, supra note 238, at 86-88. 
 243. See supra note 236.  In addition to requiring warning labels on cigarette 
packages, the act “specified in great detail the appropriate phrasing of warnings, 
requirements for outdoor billboards, and appropriate size fonts for each warning.  
Armed with the statute, Big Tobacco repeatedly won cases asserting that the smoker 
knew that the habit was dangerous and voluntarily chose to smoke knowing the 
risks.” John J. Zefutie, Jr., From Butts to Big Macs – Can the Big Tobacco Litigation 
and Nation-Wide Settlement with States’ Attorneys General Serve as a Model for 
Attacking the Fast Food Industry?, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 1383, 1388-89 (2004). 
 244. Courtney, supra note 238, at 87 (citing Rabin, supra note 241, at 186). 
 245. Id. at 88. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. 
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ounce tax on beverages, particularly soda, that contain over fifty 
percent sugar, using the recently upheld Philadelphia soda tax as a 
model.  Both civil actions and local legislation may ultimately 
encourage other companies to respond to public health concerns and 
modify their products to make them healthy, just as Pepsi is 
promising to do. 
The current public health crisis surrounding obesity and diabetes 
presents a costly and dangerous problem for American society 
today.248  Despite the recent development of new FDA labeling 
guidelines requiring the disclosure of “added sugars,” it is unclear 
how effective or responsive Congress or federal agencies will be in the 
future.  Federal agencies may be unable to create and enforce 
meaningful regulation, because companies in the food and beverage 
industry, as well as special interest groups (such as the ABA), are 
willing to pay exorbitant amounts of money in lobbying and campaign 
contributions to protect their interests, which do not align with 
increased regulations.249  Furthermore, as long as there is a revolving 
door between private and public sector employees, where industry 
insiders hold positions within federal agencies, the agencies 
themselves may be ineffective in regulatory action.250  Rather, 
individuals should serve as private attorneys general and hold Big 
Soda companies accountable through the courts.  Given the difficulty 
plaintiffs have faced in the past regarding obesity litigation brought 
against fast food restaurants, cities and states should take local action 
to reduce obesity, diabetes, and other related health issues, by 
imposing a soda or sugary beverage tax. 
A. Renewed Litigation Efforts:  No Sugar-Coating 
Litigation brought against food and beverage corporations, and 
specifically large soda companies, on the basis of sugar 
overconsumption may prove more successful than obesity litigation 
brought strictly against fast food restaurants.251  Plaintiffs should use 
the success in tobacco litigation to make a claim of design and 
                                                                                                                 
 248. See Romero, supra note 4, at 241; see also NESTLE, supra note 5, at 393. 
 249. See discussion supra Section II.A. 
 250. See discussion supra Section II.A. 
 251. There are many avenues through which consumers can hold Big Soda 
accountable for creating and selling such unhealthy products.  Although the plaintiffs 
failed to survive a 12(b)(6) motion in Pelman, potential litigation against large food 
or beverage corporations may still be possible.  In fact, Judge Sweet’s decision in 
Pelman may have opened the door for litigation by providing the precise information 
and evidence necessary for a successful claim. See generally Pelman v. McDonald’s 
Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
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warning defects against large soda companies.252  Of the two claims, 
the failure to provide sufficient warning claim is likely stronger than 
the design defect claim, but both offer potential approaches to pursue 
litigation. 
1. Design Defect 
The design defect claim exists when “the foreseeable risks of harm 
posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the 
adoption of a reasonable alternative design by the seller or other 
distributor . . . and the omission of the alternative design renders the 
product not reasonably safe.”253  For a successful design defect claim, 
plaintiffs must first show that consumer soda posed a foreseeable risk.  
Once the plaintiffs have demonstrated this foreseeable risk existed, 
they must show the existence of a reasonable and safe design that the 
soda companies should have pursued and used.  Specifically, plaintiffs 
would claim that soda companies could have created a formula with 
less sugar, thereby reducing the health risks of consuming the 
product. 
Soda companies are likely aware of the dangers posed by 
consuming large amounts of sugar254 and, therefore, would be attuned 
to the foreseeable risks posed by high-sugar content sodas.  Because 
sugar comprises a significant portion of the soda formula, plaintiffs 
should target the dangers inherent in sugar consumption and 
overconsumption.  As discussed in Parts I and II, there is significant 
evidence pointing to sugar as one of the—if not the—primary causes 
of obesity and diabetes.255  After carbonated water, high fructose corn 
syrup is the largest ingredient in most regular (non-diet or sugar-free) 
sodas, including Coca-Cola, Pepsi, Sprite, and Dr. Pepper.256  
Furthermore, because it delivers fructose in a liquid form, sodas 
present a uniquely dangerous product.257  When sugar, specifically 
fructose, is consumed in liquid form, the fructose rushes to the 
liver.258  Consuming fructose in liquid form exacerbates the health 
                                                                                                                 
 252. See Romero, supra note 4. 
 253. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PROD. LIAB. § 2 (1998); supra Section II.E. 
 254. See O’Connor, supra note 84; see also O’Connor, supra note 11. 
 255. NESTLE, supra note 5, at 405-06, NESTLE, supra note 2, at 66; see generally 
GARY TAUBES, THE CASE AGAINST SUGAR (2016). 
 256. COCA-COLA, supra note 78; PEPSICO, supra note 78; Dr Pepper, DR. PEPPER, 
http://www.drpepper.com/en/products/drpepper [https://perma.cc/5A36-557R]; 
Sprite, COCA-COLA, http://www.coca-colaproductfacts.com/en/coca-cola-products/
sprite/ [https://perma.cc/SCA6-9QCS]. 
 257. See discussion supra Sections I.A, I.B. 
 258. Taubes, supra note 1; FED UP, supra note 51. 
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risks that already exist with typical sugar consumption because it 
overloads the liver, forcing it to convert the fructose into fat, which 
can induce insulin resistance.259  Insulin production can then cause 
obesity, metabolic syndrome, and a number of related adverse health 
conditions.260 
A notable challenge in the design defect argument is that, despite 
some calls that sugar is a toxin in any amount,261 recent experts have 
emphasized that sugar ingestion is particularly harmful when it is 
over-consumed.262  Even if sugar is considered a toxin analogous to 
tobacco or alcohol, it would not constitute a toxin for product liability 
purposes under existing tort law.263  So long as design defect tort law 
is limited to products that contain true “toxic” materials and the soda 
serving-size remains within the bounds of the “healthy” daily sugar 
intake, design defect claims will likely prove futile.  If the original 
product at issue is not considered harmful, then there would be no 
reason for the company to pursue a safer alternative.  Even if the 
court found that a single serving of soda was harmful, plaintiffs may 
nevertheless have difficulty pursing a design defect claim because of 
the balancing inquiry required by the risk-utility test. 
2. Failure to Warn 
Plaintiffs should investigate three different avenues for a duty to 
warn claim against soda companies.  The first is that sodas are 
scientifically addictive based on their ingredients.  Second, plaintiffs 
should encourage courts to adopt an expanded duty-to-warn standard 
for practical addiction where the scientific evidence is still being 
developed.  Finally, plaintiffs should allege that due to the large 
amount of sugar in a serving of soda, the beverage companies had a 
duty to warn the consumer about the risks of consuming large 
amounts of sugar. 
                                                                                                                 
 259. See discussion supra Section I.B; see generally JOHN YUDKIN, PURE, WHITE, 
AND DEADLY:  HOW SUGAR IS KILLING US AND WHAT WE CAN DO TO STOP IT 
(1986). 
 260. “[Dr. Robert Lustig’s] argument . . . is that sugar has unique characteristics, 
especially in the way the human body metabolizes the fructose in it . . . that may 
make it singularly harmful, at least if consumed in sufficient quantities.” Taubes, 
supra note 1 (emphasis added). 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. 
 263. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, cmt. i. (see also supra note 
206 and accompanying text). 
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There is developing evidence that soda may be addictive.264  Sugar 
is the largest ingredient in soda after carbonated water.  As such, 
evidence that sugar possesses addictive qualities should imply that 
sodas containing large amounts of sugar would be similarly addictive.  
While “sweetness is well established to reinforce the desire to eat,”265 
the debate surrounding whether sugar is addictive is controversial and 
still developing.266  Researchers have studied the potential for sugar 
addiction by comparing sugars with other abusive drugs.267  Unlike 
traditional substance abuse, the effects of sugar addiction may not be 
as visible or immediate.268  Scientific evidence shows that sugar 
induces the same response in the brain’s reward center as nicotine, 
cocaine, heroin, and alcohol, all substances known to cause 
addiction.269  A critical question for determining scientific addiction is 
what differentiates a substance that triggers the reward center causing 
pleasure from a substance that is addictive, and what results when a 
substance is both.270  In 2007, French scientists compared sugar and 
cocaine cravings in rats,271 and found that “[r]ats given sweetened 
water in experiments find it significantly more pleasurable than 
cocaine, even when they’re addicted to the latter, and more than 
heroin as well.”272  Furthermore, scientists addicted rats to cocaine 
over the course of months and then offered the addicted rats a sweet 
solution or its cocaine fix; it only took two days for the rats to choose 
the sweets over the cocaine.273   
                                                                                                                 
 264. See generally NESTLE, supra note 2, at 64-65. 
 265. Id. at 49. 
 266. While “[s]ugar craving does seem to be hard-wired in our brains,” the debate 
may ultimately be whether sugar is actually addictive or whether society just treats it 
as such. TAUBES, supra note 255, at 33, 37.  But this begs the question of whether 
scientific addiction should be distinguished from practical addition when the 
company knowingly creates the product. 
 267. Id.  In fact, sweet and sugary beverages are sometimes used to wean addicts 
off harder drugs. Id. at 41. 
 268. Critically: 
[S]ugar appears to be a substance that causes pleasure with a price that is 
difficult to discern immediately and paid in full only years or decades later.  
With no visible, directly noticeable consequences . . . questions of ‘long-term 
nutritive or medical consequences went unasked and unanswered.’  Most of 
us today will never know if we suffer even subtle withdrawal symptoms from 
sugar, because we’ll never go long enough without sugar to find out. 
Id. at 34. 
 269. Id. at 40. 
 270. Id. at 41. 
 271. Magalie Lenoir et al., Intense Sweetness Surpasses Cocaine Reward, 2 PLOS 
ONE 8, 1 (2007). 
 272. TAUBES, supra note 255, at 41. 
 273. See id. 
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Research into the addictive qualities of sugar is ongoing and may 
take years to develop hard-scientific evidence, especially because 
human studies are scarce or non-existent.  Nevertheless, the current 
evidence paints a picture of likely addiction, similar to that of illicit 
drugs.  Soda not only contains high levels of likely addictive sugar, but 
also contains caffeine, which is known to be addictive.274  Again, there 
is currently little known research to scientifically answer whether soda 
is addictive.  However, given the strong evidence of addictive 
qualities of sugar, compounded with the known evidence of caffeine 
addiction, there is sufficient suggestion to give courts pause before 
dismissing such claims.  For plaintiffs to pursue a successful failure to 
warn claim, they must show that the defendant was aware of the risk 
and did not disclose this information to the consumer.  Therefore, 
plaintiffs would need some reason to believe and prove that internal 
research within the food and beverage industry exposed evidence that 
soda (or substantial ingredients in soda, such as sugar) is addictive.275 
Beyond scientific addiction, plaintiffs and courts should expand 
failure to warn claims to practical addiction because soda formulas 
are created to specifically bypass certain neurological signals to 
encourage overconsumption.  Soda formulas are carefully created and 
manipulated to ensure that no single flavor overpowers the 
consumer’s palate.276  This effect enables the consumer to drink more 
soda, because she does not “get sick” of the flavor.  Additionally, 
because soda is a liquid, the brain may not receive the psychological 
                                                                                                                 
 274. Notably: 
Addiction researchers are especially interested in sodas because they 
contain another potentially addictive substance, caffeine, as well as sugars.  
The caffeine in sodas is low—less than 40 milligrams in a 12-ounce serving—
but that may be enough to stimulate dependence, especially in combination 
with sugars . . . . The caffeine is there for a different purpose [than taste]; it 
makes people enjoy drinking the product even more than does sugar on its 
own.  At least one study found that the addition of even small amounts of 
caffeine to sugary drinks makes people drink more of them. 
NESTLE, supra note 2, at 49 (citing Russell S. J. Keast & Lynn J. Riddell, Caffeine as 
a Flavor Additive in Soft Drinks, 49 APPETITE 255, 255-59 (2007); Russell S. J. Keast 
et al., Caffeine Increases Sugar-Sweetened Beverage Consumption in a Free-Living 
Population:  A Randomized Controlled Trial, 113 BRIT. J. NUTRITION 366, 366-71 
(2015)). 
 275. Courts should look at the addition of caffeine, a known addictive substance, to 
soda to determine whether the caffeine serves any legitimate purpose other than to 
enhance the soda-drinking experience. Id. 
 276. MOSS, supra note 55, at 105. 
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regulatory signal that it is full.277  Calories from soda are more than 
empty calories—they are dangerous calories containing fructose that, 
due to the liquid form, can overwhelm the body’s metabolic system.278  
Furthermore, even though the body just consumed nearly sixty 
percent of the daily value of sugar by drinking one twelve ounce 
serving of soda, it does not think it is full and therefore will likely seek 
additional sustenance to feel satiated.279  This additional sustenance 
will almost certainly contain more sugar.  Ultimately, by consuming 
soda, the body is deceived and unknowingly consumes nearly sixty 
percent of its recommended daily sugar value without feeling full.  
This entire scenario certainly encourages, and likely directly leads to, 
overconsumption of sugar on a daily basis.  Again, plaintiffs will have 
to prove that the industry is aware of these risks; however, given the 
fact that food products are intentionally created to promote 
consumption, and soda companies are aware of the amount of sugar 
in each serving, the industry is, or should be, aware of the potential 
for practical addiction that likely results in sugar overconsumption.280 
The final failure to warn argument does not depend on a claim of 
scientific or practical addiction, but it points to the health risks 
associated with sugar.  The Pelman plaintiffs asserted a general failure 
to warn about the health risks associated with food products, but the 
court rejected the claim that McDonald’s failed to warn consumers 
about the dangers of eating too much of its fast food products, by 
emphasizing that the reasonable consumer is aware of the inherent 
danger in eating fast food.281  Unlike the danger of consuming foods 
high in fat and cholesterol, the public is less knowledgeable about the 
dangers of consuming sugar.  In fact, many Americans likely do not 
know how much sugar they should consume on a daily basis.282  The 
                                                                                                                 
 277. “Most research suggests that it is only the sugars consumed in drinks that 
bypass physiological regulatory controls.” NESTLE, supra note 2, at 46; see also supra 
Sections I.A, I.B. 
 278. Taubes, supra note 1, and accompanying text; FED UP, supra note 51. 
 279. In humans, studies have shown that “the more sugary drinks people consume, 
the more calories they consume from any source.” NESTLE, supra note 2, at 45-46. 
 280. See generally MOSS, supra note 55, at 98-99, 104-06 (discussing how sodas are 
created to encourage “heavy usage”). 
 281. Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding 
the risk associated with eating a large amount of fast food was sufficiently obvious to 
not require a warning). 
 282. Until recently, nutrition labels were not required to include the daily value 
percentage for sugar consumption. See discussion supra Sections II.A, II.B.  
Furthermore, the average American consumes far more sugar than recommended by 
various health authorities, suggesting consumers are not aware of the risk of 
overconsumption. See discussion supra Part I. 
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limited knowledge is due, in large part, to the sugar industry’s active 
campaign to shift focus from the role of sugar to the role of fat in 
causing various health concerns (concerns that are now becomming 
associated with sugar).283  Unlike the developing research into 
whether sugar is addictive, soda companies should have been well 
aware of the risks posed by consuming sugar,284 but they did not 
disclose this information to the public in any form.  Rather, the soda 
companies sought to change the conversation and encourage a 
reduction of all calories, a reduction in fat consumption, and an 
increase in activity.285 
In Pelman, the court held that the failure to warn claim failed 
because of the well-known health risks associated with eating fast 
food on a regular basis.286  The same cannot be said for the dangers 
associated with consuming sugar.  While it may be common 
knowledge that sugar consumption should be modified to some 
extent, until the new FDA labeling requirements are implemented 
and widely understood, the general public is likely unaware of how 
much someone should consume on a daily basis.  Furthermore, there 
is clear evidence that the food industry sought to redirect attention 
and criticism from sugar to fat.287  Through a winning public relations 
campaign, the sugar industry successfully changed the narrative to fat 
as the evil cause of obesity and related health problems. 
Proving causation presents a major challenge to litigation against 
soda companies.  In Pelman, Judge Sweet identified the plaintiffs’ 
inability to prove that the McDonald’s products, rather than other 
foods or lifestyle choices, caused the plaintiffs’ injuries.288  Similarly, it 
would be nearly impossible to identify regular soda as the individual 
cause of an individual’s health problems (such as obesity or diabetes).  
Most notably, sugar (and added sugar) is found in most processed 
foods, so it would likely be impossible to separate the sugar from the 
product at issue in litigation from the sugar in other foods.  The best 
potential approach to causation is the market share liability approach 
                                                                                                                 
 283. See O’Connor, supra note 11 (explaining how the Sugar Association paid 
scientists in the 1960s to promote saturated fat as the main cause of heart disease, 
thus downplaying the developing research suggesting a strong link between sugar and 
heart disease); see also O’Connor, supra note 84. 
 284. Throughout the 1960s, British nutrition authorities did a series of experiments 
exposing the dangers of consuming sugar and published a criticism of sugar called 
“Sweet and Dangerous.” Taubes, supra note 1. 
 285. O’Connor, supra note 84. 
 286. Id. 
 287. O’Connor, supra note 11. 
 288. Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 512, 536 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
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developed in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories.289  Under the market 
share liability theory, plaintiffs who are unable to identify a single 
manufacturer, through no fault of their own, can sue multiple actors 
who produced the injurious product, and the industry actors pay 
damages based on their share of the market.290  Soda litigation, 
however, still fails to meet certain requirements necessary for market 
share liability.  First, unlike the Sindell cases, sodas are unlikely to be 
considered fungible goods, because each soda company likely uses a 
different, highly protected formula.291  Additionally, because soda can 
cause a number of related health problems later in life, plaintiffs 
would be unable to demonstrate a “signature illness” associated with 
soda consumption.292  Even assuming plaintiffs could demonstrate 
they only consumed soda from one producer, thereby ignoring the 
market share liability argument, they would face the same causation 
challenges illustrated in Pelman and would likely face dismissal.293 
B. Sweet Success:  Increasing Local and State Government Action 
Consumers and legislatures should encourage and support soda, or 
high-sugar beverage, taxes at the local and state levels.294  The federal 
                                                                                                                 
 289. 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980).  In Sindell, due to the delayed adverse impact of a 
medicine, plaintiffs were unable to identify the specific manufacturer who had 
created the specific pills they consumed.  Rather than find in favor of defendants, the 
court adopted a new theory of market share liability, wherein all manufacturers who 
created the dangerous product could be held partially liable for the resulting injury. 
See generally Harv. L. Rev. Ass’n, Market Share Liability:  An Answer to the DES 
Causation Problem, 94 HARV. L. REV. 668 (1981). 
 290. Harv. L. Rev. Ass’n, supra note 289, at 673-77. 
 291. Cf. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 926 (“DES was produced from a common and 
mutually agreed upon formula as a fungible drug interchangeable with other brands 
of the same product; defendants knew or should have known that it was customary 
for doctors to prescribe the drug by its generic rather than its brand name and that 
pharmacists filled prescriptions from whatever brand of the drug happened to be in 
stock.”); see also Skipworth v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 690 A.2d 169 (Pa. 1997) (finding 
market share liability inapplicable to lead paint cases, because paint formulas vary 
and therefore paint was not a fungible good).  Furthermore, even if plaintiffs 
attempted to identify sugar as the specifically harmful element of soda, the sugar in 
processed foods can be different combinations of pure cane sugar, glucose, fructose, 
etc. See Taubes, supra note 1. 
 292. See generally Sindell, 607 P.2d 924. 
 293. No reasonable person could find probable cause based on the facts in the 
complaint without resorting to “wild speculation.” Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d. at 538 
(citing Price v. Hampson, 142 A.D.2d 974, 975-76 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (ruling on 
causation as matter of law as jury could find causation only by engaging in “wild 
speculation.”)). 
 294. “[T]ax policies were demonstrably effective in discouraging cigarette 
smoking . . . . [and r]esearchers published systematic reviews arguing that taxes on 
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government has considered the implementation of local and state 
soda taxes and, in 2010, the White House Obesity Task Force 
recommended an analysis of the effect of state and local taxing on 
“energy-dense” foods, including sodas.295  Two years later, health 
advocates found the evidence against soda “so compelling that more 
than one hundred groups and individuals called on [the Department 
of] Health and Human Services to produce a Surgeon General’s 
report on soda consumption equivalent in authority to the Surgeon 
General’s reports on smoking.”296  A number of counties and now 
one major city in the United States have already passed such an 
initiative, either through legislation or referendums.297 
Berkeley, California, was the first city to adopt a soda tax in 2015, 
and recent studies show promising data that this type of tax may be 
successful in reducing or curbing high-sugar soda beverage 
consumption.298  The data illustrates that low-income neighborhoods, 
areas where there is higher soda and sugar consumption rates, as well 
as higher rates of obesity and diabetes, have seen a decrease in soda 
consumption as high as twenty-one percent.299  Just south of the 
United States border, Mexico passed a national sugary beverage tax 
in 2014300 and after one year saw the sale of sugary beverages 
decrease twelve percent.301  In response to these promising results, 
“[p]ublic health authorities hailed the findings as the first hard 
                                                                                                                 
sugary drinks were justified historically and would produce substantial economic 
benefits, along with improvement.” NESTLE, supra note 5, at 405. 
 295. Id. 
 296. Id. 
 297. See Charles, supra note 139; see also Alexandra Sifferlin, Mexico’s Sugary 
Drink Tax is Working, Study Suggests, TIME (Jan. 6, 2016), http://time.com/
4168356/mexico-sugar-drink-soda-tax/ [https://perma.cc/D8NA-WBPX]. 
 298. See Charles, supra note 139. 
 299. See id.; see also Yasmin Anwar, Soda Tax Linked to Drop in Sugary Beverage 
Drinking in Berkeley, BERKELEY NEWS (Aug. 23, 2016), http://news.berkeley.edu/
2016/08/23/sodadrinking/ [https://perma.cc/VR2E-8K2P].  One significant criticism of 
the Philadelphia soda tax is that it is a regressive tax, meaning it disproportionately 
affects and harms low income individuals.  While this may be a valid characterization 
of the tax, it may be a necessary evil.  Low-income communities are more likely to 
consume larger amounts of sugar and, furthermore, have relatively high risks of 
obesity and diabetes. NESTLE, supra note 2, at 35-36, 185-86.  Perhaps it is not entirely 
negative that these taxes will discourage low-income individuals from consuming this 
harmful and largely unnecessary product. 
 300. “In January 2014, Mexico implemented an excise tax of 1 peso per liter for 
sugar-sweetened beverages as a way to cut down on the country’s growing obesity 
epidemic.” Sifferlin, supra note 297. 
 301. Anahad O’Connor, Mexican Soda Tax Followed by Drop in Sugary Drink 
Sales, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2016), http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2016/01/06/mexican-
soda-tax-followed-by-drop-in-sugary-drink-sales/ [https://perma.cc/5SC8-JZFD]. 
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evidence that a nationwide tax could spur behavioral changes that 
might help to chip away at high obesity rates.”302  Although the 
immediate data shows decreases in soda and sugary-beverage 
consumption, it will likely take many years to see if the sugary 
beverage taxes show any impact on obesity rates or the health risks 
associated with obesity.  But this fact should not discourage increased 
soda tax initiatives throughout the United States. 
The recent court decision in the Court of Common Pleas of 
Philadelphia County303 should also encourage consumers and local 
and state legislatures to adopt and expand soda tax initiatives.  As 
explained in Part II, Philadelphia was the first major city in the 
United States to adopt a soda tax, 1.5 cents per ounce for sodas and 
other sugary beverages.304  Shortly after the Philadelphia City Council 
passed this groundbreaking legislation, a group of Philadelphia 
residents, businesses, and industry associations challenged the tax as 
allegedly violating the Pennsylvania Constitution, as preempted by 
the state’s taxing power, and as taxing an item under SNAP 
benefits.305  The Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas rejected 
plaintiff’s claims and dismissed the case in its entirety.306  Because the 
uniformity clause may be unique to Pennsylvania’s Constitution, the 
court’s rejection of this argument likely bears little influence on 
subsequent taxes or legal battles that may ensue.   
The court’s rejection of the preemption claim and SNAP benefits 
claim, however, could extend beyond Pennsylvania.  The court’s 
dismissal is a major blow to the ABA and likely represents a viable 
future for soda, or high-sugar beverage, taxes moving forward.307  
                                                                                                                 
 302. Id.  Notably, “Mexico’s obesity epidemic has attracted worldwide attention.  
Of the 34 developed countries that are members of the O.E.C.D., Mexico has the 
highest rate of adults who are overweight or obese—about 70 percent—and the 
highest rate of Type 2 diabetes.  It also has the highest per capita intake of soft 
drinks, which account for 70 percent of the total added sugars consumed by the 
average Mexican.”  While all socio-economic groups saw a decline in soda sales, the 
decrease was greatest among those people of low-income, who saw a seventeen 
percent decrease in consumption. Id. 
 303. Opinion & Order, Williams v. City of Philadelphia (Phila. Ct. C.P. 2016) (No. 
1452). 
 304. Burke, supra note 138. 
 305. Vargas & Nadolny, supra note 162. 
 306. Id. 
 307. The plaintiffs have a right to appeal the court’s opinion.  The president of the 
Pennsylvania Food Merchants Association indicated that the industry coalition 
challenging the tax would appeal the court’s ruling. Scott Calvert, Judge Dismisses 
Lawsuit Against Philadelphia Soda Tax, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 19, 2016), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/judge-dismisses-lawsuit-against-philadelphia-soda-tax-
1482181175 [https://perma.cc/YG24-5L8V]. 
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Specifically, the court rejected plaintiffs’ claims that the soda tax was 
preempted by the state’s sales tax, “because the two taxes are 
fundamentally different.”308  Sales taxes are levied at the point of sale, 
while the soda tax is to be levied at the point of distribution.309  
Although the plaintiffs alleged that the distributors are likely to pass 
some of the tax burden onto the consumer, thus effectively creating a 
sales tax, Judge Glazer found that argument was “not relevant” and 
what matters is how the tax “operates, not what private actors will do 
in response to the tax to offset the burden of the tax.”310  Ultimately, 
because the tax is collected from the distributor, it does not matter 
whether that burden is then shifted to the consumer.  The court also 
rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that “cities or states are barred from 
taxing items that are purchased with federally funded food stamps 
under . . . SNAP.”311  By rejecting these two arguments that could be 
brought by other states where soda taxes are implemented, the court 
signaled that soda taxes burdening beverage distributors could be 
upheld as a separate tax from sales taxes and are not preempted by 
the states’ power to levy a sales tax.   
Even without the court victory for Philadelphia’s soda tax 
legislation, momentum from the success of the Philadelphia soda tax 
has been gaining.312  In November 2016, residents in four counties 
passed ballot measures to impose a soda tax.313  San Francisco, 
Oakland, and Albany counties in California passed a referendum to 
                                                                                                                 
 308. Vargas & Nadolny, supra note 162. 
 309. Id. 
 310. Id. 
 311. Judge Rejects Lawsuit to Stop Philadelphia Soda Tax, CSP DAILY NEWS 
(Dec. 20, 2016), http://www.cspdailynews.com/category-news/beverages/articles/
judge-rejects-lawsuit-stop-philadelphia-soda-tax [https://perma.cc/Y3Q4-36M8]. 
 312. Aubrey, supra note 1.  Of note, the soda industry has reportedly reserved 
nearly $9.5 million in airtime ad buys aimed at defeating the initiative in San 
Francisco. 
 313. See Nancy Fink Huehnergarth, Passage of Four Soda Tax Measures Deals 
Major Blow to the Beverage Industry, FORBES (Nov. 9, 2016), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/nancyhuehnergarth/2016/11/09/passage-of-four-soda-
tax-measures-deals-major-blow-to-the-beverage-industry [https://perma.cc/8T65-
3TQB]: 
In California, San Francisco’s Measure V passed with 61.87% of the vote, 
Oakland’s Measure HH received a winning 60.75% of the vote, 
and Albany’s Measure O1 was approved with 70.67% support.  All three 
California measures will tax sugary drinks at a penny-per-ounce.  Voters 
also approved a fourth soda tax measure, 2H, on the ballot in Boulder, 
Colorado with an unofficial 54.01% of the vote.  The Boulder tax will be the 
largest of the four, adding two-cents-per-ounce to a variety of sugary 
beverages. 
Id.  
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levy a tax on sugar-sweetened beverages.314  Residents in Boulder, 
Colorado passed the highest soda tax, imposing a two cent per ounce 
tax on distributors of soda and other sugar-sweetened beverages.315  
Many have hailed the November 2016 results as a victory over the 
soda industry and, given the success in California, Colorado, and 
Philadelphia, more local governments should pursue similar 
regulations or voter referendums in the near future.316 
Expanding soda taxes to more cities and states will create multiple 
positive results for the consumer.  First, these taxes thus far have 
resulted in a decrease in soda consumption,317 even if the taxes are 
not created to burden the consumer.  It will be years before research 
or studies can be conducted to show what effect a decrease in soda 
consumption may have on obesity and diabetes rates but, until those 
studies are conducted, public health advocates should celebrate the 
decreased consumption of a beverage that ultimately encourages 
daily overconsumption of sugar.  Beyond the direct effect of a 
potential decrease in soda consumption, revenue from soda taxes can 
be used to fund much-needed public programs, as the Philadelphia 
mayor emphasized.318  In addition to the local effect of the tax, 
instituting these taxes throughout the country could put pressure on 
                                                                                                                 
 314. See Heather Knight, S.F., Oakland, Albany Voters Pass Soda Tax, SFGATE 
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 317. See Anwar, supra note 299; Charles, supra note 139; O’Connor, supra note 
301. 
 318. The Philadelphia soda tax is “expected to bring in $91 million to fund pre-K, 
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Sasko, Judge Dismisses Anti-Soda Tax Lawsuit, PHILLY MAG. (Dec. 19, 2016), 
http://www.phillymag.com/news/2016/12/19/court-dismisses-soda-tax-lawsuit/ 
[https://perma.cc/8ZJA-8PP4]. 
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private beverage companies to take action to modify their current 
high sugar formulas and create healthier products.319 
Pepsi’s pledge to reduce sugar in its products over the next nine 
years may represent the result of mounting pressure to reduce sugar 
in the American diet.  However, American consumers have seen 
apparent self-regulation within the food industry before and during 
Michelle Obama’s “Let’s Move” campaign.320  In response to 
Michelle Obama’s initiation of the program to combat childhood 
obesity, the food companies announced proactive measures to show 
cooperation with the Obama Administration, by reducing the total 
number of calories they sell annually.321  However, the food 
companies did not pull the unhealthy products from the shelves, but 
rather created “healthier” alternatives, such as low-calorie or fat-free 
products.322  These alternatives could prove to be more harmful than 
healthier ones, because when a food company removes fat from its 
product, it generally replaces that fat with sugar, thus reducing the 
amount of fat or calories in a product but increasing the amount of 
sugar.323  Pepsi’s pledge directly targets sugar and therefore may 
represent meaningful self-regulation, but it will be important to see 
what products are chosen for sugar reduction.  Although Pepsi 
pledged to reduce the sugar content in two-thirds of its products, 
Pepsi owns and controls a large number of food brands, and therefore 
could reduce the amount of sugar in products with already low levels 
                                                                                                                 
 319. See Aubrey, supra note 1. 
 320. See discussion supra Section II.D. 
 321. In 2010, Michelle Obama announced, “I am thrilled to say that [the processed 
food industry has] pledged to cut a total of one trillion calories from the food they sell 
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“systematic and heavily-funded industry opposition.” NESTLE, supra note 5, at 392. 
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of sugar while keeping the Pepsi—or other sugary beverage 
formulas—the same. 
A more meaningful pledge would be a commitment to reduce or 
cap sugar content in all products, as Kraft proposed in 2003.  Kraft is 
one of the largest food producers and, in 2003, proposed an initiative 
that would cap the amount of salt, sugar, and fat that food scientists 
and brand managers could add to new products.324  Again, this 
proposal only applied to new products and not products currently in 
circulation; however, the motivation behind adopting this policy was 
to begin decreasing the salt, sugar, fat, and calorie values of its entire 
thirty-five billion dollar portfolio.325  Whether Kraft is also committed 
to removing known unhealthy products from the shelves remains 
unclear, but the initiative certainly demonstrates an awareness of 
their potential culpability in the obesity crisis and “wanting to do the 
right thing by consumers.”326  Whether industry self-regulation is 
genuine or superficial, increased local action, such as imposing soda 
taxes in more cities and states throughout the country, will continue 
to challenge the powerful food and beverage industry in the fight for 
public health. 
CONCLUSION 
The food and beverage industry—especially the soda companies—
has gone too long without having to take responsibility for its role in 
the current public health crisis affecting individuals everywhere.  The 
soda companies created an unhealthy product with a dangerous 
amount of sugar without regard to the potential health risks that 
could ensue.  Furthermore, the food and beverage industry helped 
create and totally exploited the information vacuum that shifted the 
blame for health problems from sugar to fat,327 or even away from an 
unhealthy diet altogether.328  The result is an uninformed public 
consuming dangerously unhealthy soda products on a daily basis 
without the proper disclosures about the associated risks. 
Changing this status quo is long overdue.  Because large-scale 
federal regulations will likely prove ineffective,329 ultimately 
consumers should challenge the soda industry through local 
government.  To date, six cities in the United States have adopted a 
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soda tax either through city council ordinances or voter referendums, 
demonstrating a significant blow to Big Soda.330  Furthermore, as the 
2015 soda tax in Berkeley, California demonstrates, a soda tax may 
significantly reduce soda consumption.331  If more cities continue to 
adopt these health-conscious economic policies, it may put sufficient 
pressure on food and beverage companies to take meaningful 
proactive steps to reduce the sugar content in their products and help 
curb the United States’ obesity and diabetes epidemic.332 
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